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EURO ZONE CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE NEW SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
Philomila Tsoukala* 
This Article analyzes the changes in European governance since the 
beginning of the euro crisis in relation to the project of constructing Social 
Europe.  The Article tracks the incorporation of a structural reform agenda 
originally designed as bailout conditionality for countries on the verge of 
default into EU economic governance as a strategy for growth.  Beyond the 
contestable grounds of this reform agenda, its adoption by the EU in the 
mode of crisis management poses serious questions of legitimacy.  The new 
enhanced economic coordination process includes obligatory guidelines in 
domains under the legislative competence of Member States, such as labor 
regulation and taxation, under the guise of a technocratic imperative.  The 
Article also shows that despite the intensely neoliberal character of the 
proposed structural reforms, the Commission has foregrounded the 
protection of Europe’s welfare regimes as a key reason for reform.  In 
reality, such reforms would dramatically alter welfare regimes, emptying 
out traditional welfarist goals such as the decommodification of labor 
without appropriate political processes. This Article argues that these 
developments are likely to challenge the already weakened legitimacy of the 
European Union. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The euro zone crisis has cast a dark cloud over Europe. By May 2010, Greece, 
the black sheep of the euro zone, had already signed a first loan agreement with 
members of the euro zone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 Shortly 
after, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted as saying, “We’re right to tell 
the Greeks: you have to save money, you have to be candid and you have to work on 
your honesty, otherwise we can’t help you.”2 In June 2011, Chancellor Merkel 
chided citizens of countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain for allegedly taking 
long vacations and retiring too early. She was quoted as saying, “We can’t have a 
common currency where some get lots of vacation time and others very little. That 
won’t work in the long term.”3 As German newspaper Der Spiegel noted, this was a 
more formal way of saying that Southern Europeans do not “exert” themselves 
enough.4 Greek politicians, journalists, and citizens have returned the favor by 
 
 1 Greece obtained a first loan of €80 billion from other euro zone countries. In addition, the IMF 
contributed €30 billion. The loan was accompanied by strict conditionality that included austerity 
measures in addition to structural reforms in labor markets and the public sector. See The Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece, at 21–22, 79–80, Directorate-General for Econ. & Fin. Aff., 
Occasional Papers 61 (May 2010) [hereinafter EAPGr1]. The European Commission (EC) jointly with the 
European Central Bank (ECB) supervise the implementation of the program’s conditionality on behalf of 
the euro zone creditor countries, along with the IMF. The EC/ECB/IMF are often referred to as the 
“troika” of creditors, even though the funding does not come directly from these institutions. See e.g., 
Memorandum, Eur. Comm’n, Statement of the Troika on the Review of the Greek Programme (Oct. 17, 
2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12–789_en.htm. 
 2 Benjamin Dierks, Angela Merkel Rides Germans’ Anger at Greece, GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/apr/28/germany-greece-euro-crisis. 
 3 German Chancellor on the Offensive: Merkel Blasts Greece over Retirement Age, Vacation, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (May 18, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-chancellor-on-the-
offensive-merkel-blasts-greece-over-retirement-age-vacation-a-763294.html. 
 4 Id. Similarly, the German Finance Minister was quoted as saying: “Greece needs to do its own 
homework to become competitive . . . . We’re happy to help but we shouldn’t give others the feeling that 
they don’t have work [sic] hard themselves. Every country is responsible for itself.” Erik Kirschbaum, 
Schaeuble Warns Greek Promises No Longer Suffice, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com 
2013] THE NEW SOCIAL EUROPE 33 
hurling unflattering characterizations of the German Chancellor and the German 
people.5 
Despite the political tensions, the European Union (EU) initiated an ongoing 
crisis management scheme, establishing loan facilities for euro zone countries with 
liquidity problems6 and, more importantly, reinforcing fiscal and macro-economic 
governance at the EU level.7 The conditions of the loans to debtor countries included 
dramatic austerity measures, coupled with structural reforms relying heavily on the 
flexibilization of labor markets as a recipe for growth. More surprisingly, the new, 
reinforced economic governance for every euro zone member required austerity all 
 
/article/2012/02/12/us-germany-greece-idUSTRE81B05N20120212 (quoting Vol Olaf Gersemann & Jan 
Hildebrand, Davon geht die Welt nicht unter, WELT AM SONNTAG (July 29, 2012), 
http://www.welt.de/print/wams/wirtschaft/article108407703/Davon-geht-die-Welt-nicht-unter.html). 
 5 See, e.g., Fani Toli, Greek Journalist Yiorgos Trangas Fined €25,000 for Insulting German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, GREEK REPORTER (Feb. 23, 2012), http://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/ 
02/23/greek-journalist-yiorgos-trangas-fined-e25000–for-insulting-german-chancellor-angela-merkel/; see 
also Joshua Chaffin & Kerin Hope, Greek Rancour at Merkel’s Flying Visit, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 9 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1683551c-11e6–11e2–bbfd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2fRi7HzLw; 
Nicholas Kulish, Greek-German Tensions Over Finances Spill into Another Arena, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/world/europe/greece-vs-germany-spills-off-soccer-
field.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Felicity Morse, Greeks Rage at a ‘Nazi Angela Merkel’ in the Wake of 
Eurozone Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 2011/10/28/nazi-
merkel_n_1064052.html. 
 6 Ireland asked and received a bailout in 2010, Portugal in 2011, and Greece a second time in 2011. 
By the time Ireland requested financial support, the EU had set up two temporary special purpose vehicles 
for financing euro zone countries in financial distress: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). Both funds will be replaced by what was 
designed as a permanent financing mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Ireland’s loan 
is co-financed by the EFSF, the EFSM, and the IMF for a total of up to €85 billion, €17.5 billion of which 
will be contributed by Ireland itself. See European Commission, Economic Adjustment Programme for 
Ireland, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/ireland/index_en.htm. The Portuguese 
loan agreement was also financed jointly by the EFSF, EFSM, and IMF and managed by the troika. The 
Portuguese government agreed to receive financial assistance of up to €78 billion. See European 
Commission, Programme for Portugal, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms 
/portugal/index_en.htm. In March 2012, Greece obtained a second loan of up to €130 billion jointly from 
euro zone countries and the IMF. The second loan to Greece by euro zone creditors was not funded 
bilaterally, but rather through the EFSF that had become operational shortly after Greece signed its first 
loan in August 2010. See European Commission, Financial Assistance to Greece, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_ loan_facility/index_en.htm; see also The Second Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece, at 2, Directorate-General for Econ. & Fin. Aff., Occasional Papers 94 
(Mar. 2012) [hereinafter EAPGr2]. 
    7   The main vehicles of financial assistance are the EFSF, EFSM, and ESM. See supra note 6; see 
also European Commission, Intergovernmental Support Mechanisms, http://ec.europa.eu/economy 
_finance/european_stabilisation_actions/index_en.htm. The EU has adopted a number of new regulations 
and a directive aimed at reinforcing fiscal and macro-economic supervision. The so-called six-pack is a 
combination of five regulations and one directive that entered into force in December 2011. See European 
Commission, Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal Compact? A Short Guide to the New EU Fiscal Governance, 
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles /governance/2012–03–14_six_pack_en.htm 
[hereinafter Guide to EU Fiscal Governance]. They provide a reinforcement of “the preventive and the 
corrective” parts of EU fiscal supervision, and they are meant to strengthen compliance with the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), which forbids member states from maintaining a public debt of more than 60% 
GDP or a budget deficit of more than 3% GDP. Id. An agreement on an additional “two-pack” of EU 
legislation that significantly reinforces budgetary supervision of national budgets has been reached and 
came into force in May 2013. See Memorandum, Eur. Comm’n, “Two-Pack” Enters into Force, 
Completing Budgetary Surveillance Cycle and Further Improving Economic Governance for the Euro 
Area (May 27, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13–457_en.htm.  
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around, coupled with structural reforms, or what the European Commission (“the 
Commission”) has euphemistically called “differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidation.”8 
This Article tracks the transformation of what began as specific loan 
conditionality for over-indebted euro zone members in need of a bailout into an EU 
endorsed vision for the “profound restructuring” of European economies.9 It argues 
that the overall reform agenda emerging from the Commission’s crisis management 
measures bears remarkable similarities to reform proposals originated in 
international development institutions during the 1990s, and relies heavily on the 
flexibilization of labor markets and welfare regimes.10 When checked against the 
actual, fragile state of our knowledge about recipes for growth, especially in the 
post-crisis world of destabilized economic theory, the Commission’s seeming 
confidence gives one pause. Various aspects of the structural reform agenda 
endorsed by the Commission are highly contested in theory and have proven dubious 
in practice.11 More importantly, many aspects of this agenda, especially those related 
 
 8 European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2013, at 3, COM (2012) 750 final (Nov. 28, 2012) 
[hereinafter Growth Survey 2013]. The coordinated austerity in the entire euro zone has arguably resulted 
in a contraction-depression in the South, exacerbated by the simultaneous and unnecessary austerity drive 
in the North. See Jan in ‘t Veld, Fiscal Consolidations and Spillovers in the Euro Area Periphery and 
Core, Directorate-General for Econ. & Fin. Aff., Economic Papers 506 (Oct. 2013). According to the 
Greek government, the Greek economy has shrunk by about 20% GDP since 2008 and is expected to 
shrink by 25% GDP by 2014. See Philip Inman & Helena Smith, Greek Economy to Shrink 25% by 2014, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/18/greek-economy-shrink-
great-depression. The Greek unemployment rate has reached an unprecedented 27.9%, while 61.5% of 
young people between the ages of 18–25 were unemployed. Press Release, Eurostat, Euro Area 
Unemployment Rate at 11.9% (Mar. 1, 2013), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3–
01102013–AP/EN/3–01102013–AP-EN.PDF. The percentage of Greeks at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion has reached 31% and even Greece’s strongest safety net, the family, is showing signs of stress, 
with an unprecedented level of homelessness in urban centers. Press Release, Eurostat, In 2011, 24% of 
the Population Were at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://epp.euro 
stat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3–03122012–AP/EN/3–03122012–AP-EN.PDF; see also Helena 
Smith, Greek Homeless Shelters Take in Casualties of Debt Crisis, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2012), available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/10/greek-homeless-shelters-debt-crisis. Spain’s economy 
remained in recession between 2009 and 2013 after an impressive sixteen year growth spurt, fuelled by 
cheap credit since its entry into the euro zone. Even though its contraction has not had the monumental 
dimensions of the Greek recession, its unemployment rate is at a breathtaking 26.2%. See Euro Area 
Unemployment Rate at 11.9%, supra note 8. The Spanish economy has shrunk by about 15% GDP since 
2008. See Trading Economics, Spain GDP, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/gdp. The Spanish 
economy formally exited the recession in October 2013, registering a 0.1% GDP growth, which has yet to 
deliver jobs. See Tobias Buck, Spain’s Economy Strengthens but Gloomy Mood Lingers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
28, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d64c3d6c-3721–11e3–9603–00144feab7de.html#axzz2k4 
Kd4lQv. The economy in Portugal was on a similar downward trend. See Joao Lima & Henrique 
Almeida, Portuguese Economy Contracts for an Eighth Straight Quarter, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012–11–14/portuguese-economy-contracts-for-an-eighth-straight-
quarter.html. Germany’s economy also suffered a contraction in the last quarter of 2012. See Denise 
Roland, Eurozone Dragged Further into Recession as German Economy Shrinks, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 14, 
2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis /9869435/Eurozone-dragged-further-into-
recession-as-German-economy-shrinks.html. 
 9 See Growth Survey 2013, supra note 8, at 1. 
 10 I am referring to neoliberalism to denote the types of policies recommended to developing 
countries known as the Washington Consensus. See John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think 
About the Washington Consensus?, 15 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251 (2000). 
 11 See infra notes 115−17.  
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to labor and welfare reform, have been highly contested in Member States’ own 
democratic processes.12 
The emergence of this reform agenda as the centerpiece of EU macro-economic 
governance poses serious questions of democratic legitimacy. Despite efforts by the 
Commission to push certain reforms even before the crisis through the process of 
social policy coordination, Member States were not cooperating due to domestic 
political resistance. Without the legislative capacity needed in social policy to force 
their hand, there was very little that the Commission could do. This Article shows 
that the crisis presented a new opportunity for the entrenchment of specific ideas 
about necessary social policy reform, which the Commission grasped. In its own 
words, “[t]he on-going economic and financial crisis in the EU has been a catalyst 
for deep change.”13 Social policy reform has now been fully embedded into 
economic governance, and economic governance further collapsed into neoliberal 
reform.14 Both trends were present before the crisis, although the Commission has 
arguably pushed the content of desirable reforms further and closer to neoliberal 
policy than was previously possible. It has also insinuated itself into Member State 
social policy in what can be described as the latest significant episode of competence 
creep.15 
Paradoxically, the project of constructing Social Europe has come center stage. 
This Article argues that the Commission has promoted the idea that safeguarding 
Europe’s welfare regimes is one of the most important raisons d’être for the 
proposed reforms. In fact, such reforms, if and when applied, would amount to a 
dramatic transformation of the very same welfarism they are supposed to safeguard. 
Mores specifically, the new Social Europe emerging from EU crisis management 
entails a complete abandonment of decommodification of labor—the idea that 
workers should enjoy access to certain basic goods before they need to sell their 
labor in the market—as an acceptable social policy goal.16 Perhaps this would not be 
such a problematic move had it resulted from democratically legitimate processes 
involving widespread citizen consent. Instead, it has arrived “through the back 
 
 12 See Steffan Mau, Democratic Demand for a Social Europe? Preferences of the European 
Citizenry, 14 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 76, 76–85 (2005) (documenting domestic political resistance to the 
Europeanization of welfare in Member States); BRUNO PALIER, A LONG GOODBYE TO BISMARCK? THE 
POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 71–2, 93, 143–44, 268–9 (2010) (detailing 
political resistance to various types of welfare reform in Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy). 
 13 Growth Survey 2013, supra note 8, at 1.  
 14 In this sense, this Article departs from Deakin and Rogowski’s observation that the management 
of the crisis is risking marginalization of social policy at the EU level. Rather, it is risking the collapse of 
social policy into economic governance. See Simon Deakin & Ralf Rogowski, Reflexive Labour Law, 
Capabilities and the Future of Social Europe 24, 27 (Univ. of Warwick Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 
2011/04, 2011). Catharine Barnard underlines that the EU, once seen as a “bastion against deregulation,” 
is now driving the deregulation it resisted for many years. Catharine Barnard, The Financial Crisis and 
the Euro Plus Pact: A Labour Lawyer’s Perspective, 41 INDUS. L.J. 98, 113 (2012). The view of the EU as 
resisting deregulation is plausible from the point of view of the UK labor market. 
 15 For some classics on “competence creep,” or the constant adding of new EU competences 
through interpretation, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2405–06 
(1991). See also Mark A. Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European 
Community, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y 95 (1994); Stephen R. Weatherill, Competence Creep and Competence 
Control, 22 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 1, 5 (2004). 
 16 See generally GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990). 
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door”17 in the guise of a result dictated by technocratic imperatives, worked out 
through a combination of a decade long expert consultation through the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC), coupled with emergency measures for crisis 
management. 
Thus, the dark cloud over Europe is not only casting its shadow over Europe’s 
finances, it is also casting a cloud over the future of democratic governance in the 
European integration project. The question of the future of Social Europe might be 
the same as the question of the future of its democratic governance. 
The rest of the Article is divided in four sections. Section II provides 
background on the euro crisis by analyzing accounts of the crisis that have been 
politically salient in the crisis management process. The Article suggests that the 
Commission has adopted a distinct version of a misguided morality tale as its basic 
account of the crisis. This story centers on Member States’ slow pace of policy 
reform before the crisis as the main explanation for the crisis, implying that 
acceleration of reform pace is needed for crisis resolution. Section III reviews the 
development of EU social policy prior to the crisis, analyzing the Commission’s 
shift towards neoliberal policy in the OMC process and Member State reform 
reluctance. Section IV describes in detail the transformation of what started out as 
loan conditionality for borrowing states into a structural reform agenda for every 
euro zone country through the annual process of economic policy coordination (“the 
European Semester”). Finally, Section V considers some of the implications of this 
turn for the future of democratic governance in the European integration project. 
II. RE-CHARACTERIZING THE CRISIS: ANTS, GRASSHOPPERS AND 
REFORM LAGGARDS 
Finding solutions to a crisis requires an account of the causes. This section 
analyzes two distinct types of narratives purporting to account for the causes of the 
euro crisis. The first, a moral tale, attributes the crisis to the profligacy of southern 
European states and sees the solution in austerity measures and fiscal prudence. This 
narrative, which is misleading in attribution of cause and effect, has been adopted by 
many European politicians in the North and the South. It is currently making 
resolution of the crisis politically difficult. The second type of narrative focuses 
instead on the structural reasons that led to the outbreak of the crisis, some of which 
have to do with the trade dynamics created by the euro. The structural accounts are 
more plausible and suggest the need for structural solutions such as fiscal, banking, 
or even political union, or, in the alternative, euro exit. 
The section then turns to the European Commission’s understanding of the 
crisis, noting that the Commission embraced fiscal austerity as an opportunity for 
deepening reforms in euro zone countries previously failing in reforming their 
welfare regimes. It relied on another implicit form of a morality tale; one of corrupt 
states resisting necessary and technocratically justified reforms, to pursue a reform 
agenda previously contested and well outside the EU’s legislative purview. 
 
 17 Ha-Joon Chang, The Root of Europe’s Riots, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co .uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/28/europe-riots-root-imf-austerity (arguing that there 
is a rewriting of the social contract through the back door at play in Europe). 
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A. A Tale of Ants and Grasshoppers 
Chancellor Merkel’s quotes in the Introduction illustrate a type of narrative that 
politicians in creditor countries employed as an explanation of the crisis.18 
Politicians in their domestic sphere trying to score points with disgruntled, bailout 
weary northern European voters have mostly touted this narrative. Its bottom line is 
a morality tale that attributes the euro zone malaise to lazy southern grasshoppers 
begging for money from the productive, disciplined, ant-like northerners—and 
ultimately wasting it.19 Holding laziness and profligacy as the root causes of the 
crisis, the ant/grasshopper tale suggests an obvious solution: cut-down on the 
profligacy and all shall be well.20 
 
 18 See, e.g., Diane Francis, Greece Is Not a Country, It’s a Party, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-francis/greece-is-not-a-country-i_b_871296.html (stating that 
Greeks retired, on average, at only 53 years of age); Walter Loeb, Retirement in Germany May Rise to 
Age 69 While Greece Is at Age 58, FORBES (June 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb/ 
2012/ 06/17 /retirement-in-germany-may-rise-to-age-69–while-greece-is-at-age-58/ (comparing retirement 
ages in various European countries and highlighting that Greece is among the lowest). However, these 
accounts are not accurate. The average age of labor force exit for Greek women was 62.4 and 60.9 for 
men in 2009. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2009: OECD 
SOCIAL INDICATORS 83 tbl. SS6.1 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Society at a Glance], available at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/society-at-a-
glance-2009_soc_glance-2008–en#page3. Greek women retire, on average, slightly later than German 
women, and Greek men slightly earlier than German men. Id. German and Greek workers both retired at 
ages slightly below the OECD average. Id. The official retirement age in 2008 was 65 for both men and 
women. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION & DEV. [OECD], Greece, in PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: 
RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD COUNTRIES 1 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org 
/greece/47272439.pdf (“The normal pension age is 65 for both men and women.”). In addition, Greek 
workers work much longer hours than the OECD average and certainly much more than the average 
German. In 2008 Greeks reached an annual average of 1950 working hours, compared to the German 
average of 1422. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION & DEV., STATEXTRACTS, Average Annual Hours 
Actually Worked Per Worker (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Data 
setCode=ANHRS. From a fiscal perspective, however, Greece’s pension expenditures were significant 
even before the crisis and had long been the cause of major concern. The size of its pension expenditures 
is partly due to the fact that the Greek state was making up for meager social transfers, such as housing 
and unemployment benefits, through inefficient pension transfers. See Manos Matsaganis, The Welfare 
State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece, 21 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 501, 503 (2011). The other part of the 
explanation is the clientelist nature of the Greek state, which resulted in a hugely fragmented pension 
system. It lacked truly universal coverage and provided radically distinct benefits for different groups of 
workers. It benefited the self-employed over the salaried, public over private sector workers, the middle-
aged over the young, and men over women. Id. at 504–05. Some politicians in the European South 
charged with implementing harsh conditionality have also employed variations of the same narrative. For 
example, Theodoros Pangalos, Vice-President of the Greek government in 2009 and a very influential 
politician in the post-dictatorship period, famously attributed collective responsibility for the public debt 
problem to the average Greek by proclaiming that Greeks had “eaten” the money together by 
accumulating debt to finance a system of public sector employment. See, e.g., Tony Barber, Greece Plays 
the Ethical Blame Game, FIN. TIMES (June 21, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/42d88b20–9c1f-
11e0–acbc-00144feabdc0.html. 
 19 I explore this narrative and other explanations of the crisis more fully in Philomila Tsoukala, 
Narratives of the European Crisis and the Future of (Social) Europe, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 241 (2013). 
Greek economist Yanis Varoufakis has also used the ants and grasshoppers metaphor to describe how 
European politicians dealt with the Greek crisis. Yanis Varoufakis, Never Bailed Out: Europe’s Ants and 
Grasshoppers Revisited, YANIS VAROUFAKIS BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011), http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2011/ 
12/15/never-bailed-out-europes-ants-and-grasshoppers-revisited/. 
 20 See Robert J. Samuelson, Greece and the Welfare State in Ruins, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/21/AR2010022102914.html (“The threat 
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But the causal link between abiding by the fiscal terms of the Treaties21 and 
avoiding this crisis suggested by the ants/grasshoppers tale is not warranted. In fact, 
characterizing the crisis as a sovereign debt and therefore sovereign profligacy crisis 
at all is highly misleading. Greece had high public debt levels, which started looking 
unsustainable given the slump in growth following the 2008 crisis. However, many 
peripheral countries like Spain and Ireland had in fact decreased their public debts to 
levels even below some of the supposed ants.22 Ireland was the Celtic Tiger doing 
everything by the book, but decided to turn private bank debts into public debts in 
2008.23 Spain, which also enjoyed low sovereign debt levels before the crisis, had to 
save its banks and saw its debt rise as well.24  
Structural explanations of the crisis are more convincing. Several have to do 
with the structure of the euro itself.25 As early as April 2010, economist Martin 
Feldstein, former Chief Economic Advisor to President Reagan, pointed out that 
Greece would not have borrowed as much money between 2000−2009 but for the 
mispricing of Greek bonds in international bond markets due to the euro.26 
 
to the euro bloc ultimately stems from an overcommitted welfare state.”). For example, there are those 
who think that Greece’s failure to stick to the SGP is the cause of the crisis, and therefore believe that if 
we could only make countries stick to the SGP all would be well. See, e.g., Edin Mujagic, The Euro’s 
Greek Tragedy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/the-euro-s-
greek-tragedy (noting Greece’s routine deviations from the SGP and encouraging fiscal discipline for the 
future health of the euro zone). Alternatively, others believe that Greece is the problem, and therefore 
believe that all would be well if we could only get Greece to either fix itself or leave the EU. See David 
Crossland, Germans Vexed by ‘Stubborn’ Greeks and Their Profligate Ways, THE NAT’L (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/germans-vexed-by-stubborn-greeks-and-their-profligate-
ways (“The Greeks keep causing us problems. They should have never been let into the euro and it’s time 
they were kicked out.”). 
 21 See Guide to EU Fiscal Governance, supra note 7. 
 22 In 2007, both Spain and Ireland had debt levels below the Maastricht requirement of 60% and 
below Germany’s own debt levels. See Paul De Grauwe, Debt Sustainability Inside and Outside a 
Monetary Union 3 (June 1, 2011) (prepared for the seminar, “Fiscal sustainability in the Euro Area and in 
the U.S.”), available at http://www.obce.es/files/Paul_De_Grauwe_paper.pdf. 
 23 See, e.g., Benjamin Powell, Economic Freedom and Growth: The Case of The Celtic Tiger, 22 
CATO J. 431 (2003). Ireland’s government assumed total bank liabilities including bond holdings without 
imposing any “haircut” on private investors who had engaged in reckless behavior during Ireland’s boom. 
This added about 20% GDP of debt, led to loss of investor confidence and eventually to the Irish “bailout” 
by the troika. See Tom Healy, Private Bank Debts and Public Finances: Some Options for Ireland 10–11 
(NERI Working Paper Series, No. 2013/01, Feb. 2013), available at http://www.nerinstitute.net/ 
download/pdf/neri_wp20131_private_bank_debt_public_finances_.pdf. 
 24 See Paul De Grauwe, The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone, 45 AUSTL. ECON. REV. 255–68 
(2012). 
 25 In the words of Hendrik Van den Berg, “The problem was the single currency: a permanently 
fixed exchange rate limits a country’s response to high unemployment to fiscal stimulus. But, as Greece 
found out, if government debt grows too large, further borrowing is no longer possible. In this case, the 
government is left with no macro-economic policy with which to increase employment.” HENDRIK VAN 
DEN BERG, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND OPEN-ECONOMY MACROECONOMICS: THEORY, HISTORY, AND 
POLICY 664 (2010). In the case of Greece, a fixed exchange rate at levels that were inflationary for Greece 
contributed to further loss of competitiveness, which led to ballooning unemployment that Greece tried to 
control through public sector employment financed through borrowing.  
 26 Martin Feldstein, Why Greece Will Default, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-greece-will-default (noting that to get Greece back to 
the prescribed “debt-to-GDP ratio [of] 60% level” would mean reducing the budget deficit by 10% of its 
current GDP) [hereinafter Why Greece Will Default]. Feldstein noted that this reduction would not only be 
politically difficult, but would also lead to either an “enormous cut in government spending or a dramatic 
rise in tax revenue, or both.” Several academics foresaw significant structural problems ahead of time; 
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Moreover, he warned that the austerity measures demanded of Greece in the context 
of the 2010 loan conditionality, without the possibility of currency devaluation, 
would likely lead to further contraction, the missing of fiscal targets, and possibly 
political upheaval.27 The lesson from his position was that there were structural 
reasons for Greece’s woes besides the state’s profligacy, which had to do with the 
design of the euro itself.28 This was evident from the common problems facing 
countries throughout what began to be referred to as the European periphery, or less 
respectfully, the P.I.I.G.S. (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain).29  
The structural problem was even deeper than the mispricing of bonds. 
Economist Paul De Grauwe has argued that the structure of the common currency 
contributed to what was essentially a currency crisis of the sort developing countries 
experienced in the 1980s.30 A country like Spain, despite having lower deficit and 
debt levels than the UK before the crisis, could not force its central bank to buy its 
debt, and depended on the ECB for liquidity, which was not subject to its control.31 
As De Grauwe notes, the relevant parallel for euro zone countries is countries using 
a foreign currency. The vulnerability of such countries to financial market 
speculation when their budget deficits deteriorate is significant, because using deficit 
spending to deal with a crisis leads to a destabilizing dynamic rather than the 
equilibrating dynamic of depreciation and adjustment.32 As de Grauwe explains, this 
can set off the self-fulfilling prophecy of country insolvency through fear of country 
insolvency.33 Thus, the 2009 Europe-wide crisis is more appropriately characterized 
as a crisis of the euro as a currency, triggered by the worsening of deficits and debt 
after the 2008 crisis. The currency crisis was exacerbated by the hesitancy shown by 
 
some even claimed that those problems would lead to a likely euro breakup. See e.g., Hal S. Scott, When 
the Euro Falls Apart, 1 INT’L FIN. 207 (1998). Similarly, Martin Feldstein famously predicted that the 
euro was likely to lead to increased conflict within Europe. Martin Feldstein, EMU and International 
Conflict, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1997, at 60. For a more typically Keynesian take on the euro’s 
structural problems, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Can the Euro be Saved?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 5, 2010), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/can-the-euro-be-saved. 
 27 See Why Greece Will Default, supra note 26; see also Charles Wyplosz, And Now? A Dark 
Scenario, VOX BLOG (May 3, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/article/greek-package-eurozone-rescue-or-
seeds-unravelled-monetary-union (“The drop in public spending . . . will provoke a profound recession 
that will deepen the deficit. This, along with the social and political impact of the crisis, will undoubtedly 
prevent the Greek government from delivering on its commitments.”). 
 28 See Stiglitz, supra note 26 (noting structural problems in the euro zone, such as the fixed 
exchange rate and Germany’s trade surplus, which essentially puts the rest of the euro zone at a deficit). 
 29 See Nouriel Roubini, Teaching PIIGS to Fly, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www. 
project-syndicate.org/commentary/teaching-piigs-to-fly (referring to the group of countries as “the PIIGS 
economies” in a discussion of possible tactics for dealing with the euro zone’s financial problems); see 
also Shira Ovide, PIIGS to the Slaughterhouse. Meet GIIPS., WALL ST. J. DEALS BLOG (July 15, 2011), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/07/15/piigs-to-the-slaughterhouse-meet-giips/ (discussing how political 
correctness has led many commentators to reverse the acronym so that the indebted European periphery is 
referred to as GIIPS). 
 30 See De Grauwe, supra note 24. 
 31 Id. at 260. 
 32 Id. This is because countries in a monetary union do not have the economic boost of depreciation 
and of inflation when their bonds are massively sold off. The massive sell off of Greek bonds did not 
provoke a depreciation of the euro and its subsequent adjustment. This makes bond markets judge the 
sustainability of their debts much more harshly because these countries would need to enforce harsher 
deficit cuts to attain sustainable debt levels. 
 33 Id. at 262. 
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the ECB and European politicians to backstop the speculation by showing 
willingness to help the liquidity problems of distressed euro zone members.34  
The European crisis is also a current accounts crisis within the euro zone. Even 
though the euro zone’s trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world was almost 
entirely zero, there were tremendous trade imbalances within the euro zone. In fact, 
the trade surpluses of Germany were almost the mirror images of the trade deficits of 
the South.35 In other words, even though not all southern states had huge public 
debts, all of them had a deteriorating trade balance in relation to the European North; 
Southerners were importing from the European North more than they were 
exporting. Germany’s touted trade surpluses until 2010, which all euro zone 
members are supposed to emulate, were posted mostly in relation to the rest of the 
euro zone, and not the rest of the world.36 This means that it was an impossibility for 
Germany to have a trade surplus with the rest of the euro zone and for the rest of the 
euro zone to also be simultaneously running trade surpluses, the moral suggested by 
the ants/grasshoppers tale. Someone within the euro zone had to run deficits. 
If peripheral European countries were to sustain trade deficits with Germany, 
they needed to fund their deficits by borrowing money in the international financial 
markets, thus contributing to the debt problem.37 In different euro zone countries, the 
problem manifested itself in different ways, because in each country, a different 
sector was responsible for the trade imbalance. In Spain, there was a real estate 
bubble. In Greece, the government borrowed money to buy more arms from 
Germany and France and sustained an inefficient public sector, but, equally 
problematically, the Greek banking sector financed a consumer-spending spree.38 
Much of this credit boom though, to the public or private sector, was fuelled by 
Germany’s liberal refunneling of its trade surpluses to the South in the form of bank 
loans.39 This is why when Greece almost defaulted in April 2010, much of that debt 
was found in the hands of German and French banks and the entire European 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.; Daniel Gros, Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area: Symptom or Cause of the Crisis? 
3 (CEPS, Policy Brief No. 266, Apr. 2012), http://www.ceps.eu/book/macroeconomic-imbalances-euro-
area-symptom-or-cause-crisis. The Economist recently illustrated this principle with a soccer metaphor: 
“Germany, which retained 66% of the possession in last night’s Euro 2012 football match, is wondering 
why Greece couldn’t just do the same.” Fallacy Football, THE ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE BLOG (June 
23, 2012, 3:22 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/06/euro-competitiveness. 
 36 Gros, supra note 35. 
 37 Prior to the question of deficits, of course, comes the question of what happens to the productive 
base of a country when it opens up its markets without a comparative advantage in its main productive 
sectors. The entire European periphery has shifted to services since joining the European Economic 
Community, while at the same time shifting away from agriculture and manufacturing, and has become 
largely dependent on imports from the North for its industrial products.  
 38 Since Greece’s entry into the euro, Greek household indebtedness had been growing at 30% per 
year. Despite this rapid credit expansion before the crisis, Greek household indebtedness remained below 
the euro area average. European Central Bank, Survey Data on Household Finance and Consumption, 
Occasional Paper Series No. 100, January 2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 1144504, at 19; Portugal 
And Ireland’s Private Debt Levels Are Far Worse Than Even Greece, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2010, 
6:10 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/portugal-irelands-household-and-corporate-debt-levels-are-
far-worse-than-ever-greece-2010–11#ixzz2iwWjw36O (chart showing business and household 
indebtedness in Greece below every country in the European periphery and comparable to Germany). 
 39 Gros, supra note 35, at 4. 
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banking system shook. The sudden stop of generous lending from North to South is 
the proximate cause that detonated the European crisis in 2009. 
B. The Commission’s Version: Lagging Reformers 
The European Commission, as manager of the various loans to Ireland, Greece, 
and Portugal, has acknowledged the trade imbalance problem but has mostly 
attributed it to the increasing gap in unit labor costs between North and South.40 This 
idea posits that the excessive rise in wages after the adoption of the euro led to a loss 
in competitiveness for the European South and especially Greece, which meant a 
worsening trade balance vis-à-vis the European North. This story is compatible with 
the ants/grasshoppers tale, but the grasshoppers here are the states that did not 
sufficiently control their unit labor costs. Of course, this is a reading of the 
Commission’s version of the crisis. But it is a reading based on the fact that the 
Commission’s account fails as a structural account. 
More specifically, while there is truth in the idea that there was a widening gap 
in unit labor costs, the idea that generous wages were what caused the problem is 
misleading. To begin with, total exports for the European South remained at more or 
less stable levels between 2000−2008.41 In other words, the image of countries 
losing market shares to its more wage competitive neighbors in misleading. Greece’s 
export sectors—most of which do not compete with the industrial North anyway— 
were not characterized by excessive wages, but by wide profit margins.42 The 
problem was rather that the wide availability of credit led to a boost in domestic 
demand, which led to a disproportionate increase of imports from the European 
North. While workers in the public sector did see their wages increase, workers in 
the private sector had to complement their salaries by borrowing. Both contributed to 
the boost in demand that led to the trade imbalance with the European core. 
Thus, the European Commission’s version of the ants and grasshoppers tale 
targets reform at lazy states. Such states succumbed to group pressure from special 
 
 40 EAPGr1, supra note 1, at 3 (“The . . . increase in ULC (unit labour costs) eroded external 
competitiveness, not least with respect to the rest of the euro area . . . . [D]eteriorating external 
competitiveness translated into a rapid worsening of the current account deficit, which peaked at 14 
percent of GDP in 2008.”); The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece: First Review, at 
14−15, Directorate-General for Econ. & Fin. Aff., Occasional Papers 123 (Dec. 2012), supra note 6, at 14 
(“[W]hen it comes to the competitive impact of wages and price developments, in the period 2000–2009 
the real effective exchange rate relative to the Euro area rose by 24.0% in terms of unit labour costs . . . . 
Decomposing growth in unit labour costs confirms that the driver of this development has been excessive 
growth in compensation per employee given a tightening labour market and easy financing conditions. 
This growth in the wage bill relative to general economic activity was especially pronounced in the public 
sector . . . . the labour cost developments played a key role in preventing the emergence of a stronger 
domestic export sector in the 2000s.”). 
 41 Gros, supra note 35.  
 42 Dimitris Malliaropoulos, How Much Did Competitiveness of the Greek Economy Decline Since 
EMU Entry?, 5 EUROBANK RESEARCH: ECONOMY AND MARKETS 1, 12 (Jul. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.hardouvelis.gr/FILES/PROFESSIONAL%20WORK/OikonomiaAgores13July2010.pdf; Jesus 
Felipe & Utsay Kumar, Unit Labor Costs in the Eurozone: The Competitiveness Debate Again (Bard 
College Levy Econ. Instit., Working Paper No. 651, 2011), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/ 
pubs/wp_651.pdf (“[T]he comparison with Germany is, at least for some countries, misplaced. Using 
disaggregated data we showed that Germany is not the correct comparator as its export basket is very 
different from that of the southern European countries and of Ireland.”). 
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interests and allowed their unit labor costs to diverge from those in the North. The 
correction for this problem is a sudden depression in wages and prices that can lead 
to a readjustment of domestic demand. This is the much-touted internal devaluation, 
which is indeed the only available tool for readjusting the trade imbalance in a 
currency union lacking other tools, such as unified tax and social policy. The point 
here is that the Commission has constructed a misleading narrative of lack of 
reforms leading to bulging unit labor costs, a development which in turn allegedly 
doomed market shares and the trade balance.43 Thus, the Commission indirectly 
justified the necessity for internal devaluation in the South, which in actuality exists 
because of a faulty euro setup, through the idea of faulty states now paying the price 
of an adjustment they could have avoided if only they had played by the rules before 
the crisis. 
The structural accounts of the crisis suggest that, in the long-term, for the 
monetary union to be sustainable there needs to be political union.44 In the short-
term, Europe needs mutualization of bonds, banking union, fiscal union, or some 
other form of internal adjustment for external shocks to avert the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of solvency problems through bond market speculation.45 Otherwise, the 
political pressures caused by using internal devaluation as the only adjustment 
mechanism, coupled with the invitation to financial markets to speculate, will 
eventually lead to the demise of the euro as a currency. 
Even though the Commission has put forward the idea of such long-term 
reforms as necessary at some future point,46 it continues to tout structural reforms of 
a very neoliberal character as necessary for indebted countries. Interestingly, it has 
justified such reforms as necessary for the sake of preserving Europe’s social fabric 
and extended their reach to every euro zone member. 
C. Post-Crisis Normal: Structural Reforms in Defense of Social Europe 
The Commission’s idea of the types of structural reforms necessary for the 
correction of the competitiveness problems facing the economies of the European 
South further signals an entrenchment of a neoliberal tendency in Commission 
policy visible since at least 2005. The conditionality of the loans rests heavily on 
extreme austerity coupled with structural adjustment that includes many of the 
elements of reform programs coming out of international financial institutions in the 
 
 43 A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European 
Debate, at 20, COM (2012) 777 final (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0777:REV1:EN:PDF (“Slow or absent implementation of important 
structural reforms over long periods of time aggravated competitiveness problems and hampered Member 
States’ adjustment capacity, in some cases significantly. This contributed to increasing these Member 
States’ vulnerability.”) [hereinafter A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union]. 
 44 De Grauwe, supra note 22, at 13–14; Miguel Poiares Maduro, A New Governance for the 
European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice 18 (Robert Schuman Centre For Advanced 
Studies, Policy Paper No. 2012/11, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180248 (arguing for 
political union on the basis of democratic legitimacy).  
 45 C. Fred Bergsten & Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, The Coming Resolution of the European Crisis: An 
Update, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 11–12 (June 2012), http://piie.com/ 
publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2158. 
 46 A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 43. 
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1980s and 1990s. The new element emerging from the management of the crisis is 
that the Commission now touts such reforms as part and parcel with the goal of 
protecting Europe’s social fabric. 
Take the example of the Greek program. Despite the severe consequences of 
what the Commission calls “fiscal consolidation” for the Greek economy and social 
fabric, the Commission has insisted that the Economic Adjustment Programs are 
precisely what Greece needs. It is worth quoting the Commission at some length 
here to fully convey its understanding of the relationship between the program’s 
structural reforms and social equity: 
The economic crisis and subsequent fiscal consolidation measures have 
had an impact on the ability of Greece to achieve the Europe 2020 goals, 
especially the socially oriented ones. Nevertheless, the structural reforms, 
particularly those in the labour market, the liberalisation of several sectors 
and a number of measures to improve the business environment, will help 
promote competition, spur productivity, increase employment and reduce 
production costs, thus contributing to an increase in employment and 
limiting poverty and social exclusion in the medium term.47 
In this statement, the Commission recognized that part of the conditional 
austerity was compromising “the socially oriented” goals of EU policy. Given the 
economic destruction wreaked in Greece by the sudden stoppage of credit coupled 
with crippling austerity, this is an understatement. Nonetheless, the Commission 
insisted that the structural reforms would benefit Greece in the medium-term. In 
April 2012, the Commission published a communication entitled “Growth for 
Greece,” noting that it would be of interest to the Greek people, among others, 
“because it shows that a more fair, socially cohesive, trustworthy and efficient 
system can emerge from the current crisis.”48 In the communication, the Commission 
threw its weight behind the politically contested Economic Adjustment Programs, 
characterizing the loans that came with them as “financial aid” larger than the 
Marshall Plan,49 and repeatedly emphasizing that these programs were designed to 
ensure social equity: 
The reforms agreed under the Second Economic Adjustment Programme 
seek to create a more equitable society—where all segments of the 
 
 47 Recommendation For a Council Recommendation on Greece’s 2012 National Reform 
Programme, at 2, COM (2012) 307 final (May 30, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex 
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0307:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 48 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central 
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European 
Investment Bank: Growth for Greece, at 3, COM (2012) 183 final (Apr. 18, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/pdf/2012–04–18–greece-comm_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Growth for Greece]. 
 49 Id. at 2. The Marshall Plan consisted of grants and not thus far profitable loans for creditor 
countries. It also included direct investment in the country instead of loans whose bulk went into debt 
repayment of Greece’s creditors. See Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Budget of the Greek 
Government, Fiscal Year 2011, 165 (2010) http://www.minfin.gr/budget/2011/proyp/PDFProyp/1.0.pdf 
[in Greek] (illustrating in Table 8.7 that approximately €32.8 billion of the €38.1 billion borrowed went 
into debt servicing in 2010). See also Liz Alderman & Jack Ewing, Most Aid to Athens Circles Back to 
Europe, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/business/global /athens-no-
longer-sees-most-of-its-bailout-aid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“[A]lmost none of the money is going to 
the Greek government to pay for vital public services.”). 
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population bear a fair share of the burden of adjustment and will all enjoy 
the benefits of reform . . . . The whole population will benefit from these 
changes and deserve better governance . . . .50 
[S]ocial equity has always featured strongly in the design of the 
programmes. This is reflected in reforms of pensions, other social 
programmes, labour market, and health care and in the fight against tax 
evasion, where particular efforts have been made to protect the most 
vulnerable parts of the population.51 
As is evident in these quotes, far from seeing this as a moment of suspension of 
social concerns such as poverty and equality for the sake of needed austerity, the 
Commission sees the loan conditionality, especially the structural reforms, as part 
and parcel with the project of creating a more equitable society in Greece. 
This Article argues that this understanding of the necessary reforms that the EU 
Commission is promoting as manager of this crisis on behalf of creditor countries, 
marks an important moment for the EU as a whole, as it entails the entrenchment of 
a social policy vision that rests primarily on markets and minimal safety nets, in 
contrast to the aspirations of many a social progressive in Europe.52 However, this is 
not necessarily new. Indeed, I argue here that the crisis has been used by the 
European Commission as an opportunity to entrench a vision of social policy that 
was in the making for a while, but also to enhance its own enforcement capacity in 
social policy in a way that was not possible before the crisis. Perhaps, neither one of 
those elements would be as negative if it weren’t for the fact that there is little 
democratic consensus in Member States about these reforms, and there is very little 
democratic legitimacy for the competence creep the Commission’s entrenched 
version of technocratic governance entails. 
To show that there was no consensus as to what constitutes desirable social 
policy at the European level, I will briefly sketch an account of the OMC process, 
where the discursive and policy battle for Social Europe was already raging before 
the 2009 crisis broke out. 
III. THE PRE-CRISIS SOCIAL EUROPE 
A “market-making” project in its origins,53 the European Union has 
incorporated social policy goals at various stages of its historical development.54 
 
 50 Growth for Greece, supra note 48, at 2. 
 51 Id. at 20. 
 52 Even though many social progressives have been skeptical about the capacity or desirability of 
Europeanizing social policy, others were calling openly for such a process through the 
constitutionalization of social rights at EU level. See, e.g., Brian Bercusson, Simon Deakin et al., A 
Manifesto for Social Europe, 3 EUR. L.J. 189 (1997). Later, some expressed disillusionment about the 
corrosive effects of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on social rights and the meager 
results of Europeanization of social rights. See Alain Supiot, Conclusion: Europe’s Awakening, in 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ‘EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL’? 
292 (Marie-Ange Moreau ed., 2011). 
 53 Fritz Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, 40 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 645, 649 (2002). 
 54 For an overview of the EU’s engagement with social policy, see Catharine Barnard, EU “Social” 
Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (De Búrca & 
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Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the EU has been directly engaged in 
fashioning employment policy through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 
Since the expansion of the OMC into social policy in 2000, the process has provided 
the main terrain for negotiating the substantive contents of the project of Social 
Europe. The main results of the process before the crisis were the formation of a 
technocratic consensus on the need to reform national social protection systems and 
an intensification of the imperative to use labor markets as the main mechanism for 
providing welfare to able-bodied adults. Such reforms, however, were stalling before 
the crisis due to political resistance from Member States, reflecting a lack of 
democratic consensus about them. 
A. The Open Method of Coordination and the Lisbon agenda: Social Europe’s 
Maastricht? 
The first OMC process was in employment policy. Member States undertook a 
process of yearly review to identify best practices with a commitment to eventually 
reform their employment policies.55 This coordination process resulted in specific 
goals of convergence towards “employability, adaptability, entrepreneurship and 
gender equality,” which, along with the commitment of Member States to the 
Stability and Growth Pact, meant a move away from social democratic 
understandings of employment policy.56 Thus, social democrats who had pushed for 
the inclusion of an Employment Title in the Treaty of Amsterdam with the hope that 
this would lead to a reconstruction of elements of the welfare state at European level, 
watched as employment policy became subordinated to economic policy, and was 
then redefined as an inseparable part of the structural reforms that would transform 
Europe into the most “advanced, knowledge based” society in the world. 
Between 2000 and 2005, Member State social policy also became the object of 
an OMC process. In 2000, the European Council launched the Lisbon strategy for 
transforming the EU into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world . . . with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”57 
According to the Lisbon Presidency conclusions, this involved “modernizing” 
systems of social protection and creating “active and dynamic welfare state[s].”58 
Welfare regimes needed to be adapted “to ensure that work pays, to secure their 
long-term sustainability in the face of an ageing [sic] population, to promote social 
inclusion and gender equality, and to provide quality health services.”59 The Lisbon 
 
Craig eds., 2011). See also Fritz W. Scharpf, Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State, 4 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 18 (1997). 
 55 DIAMOND ASHIAGBOR, THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY: LABOUR MARKET 
REGULATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE 203–04, 223 (2005); Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, art. 148.2, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. 
 56 Jonathan Zeitlin, A Decade of Innovation in EU Governance: The European Employment 
Strategy, the Open Method of Coordination, and the Lisbon Strategy 2 (La Follette School, Working 
Paper No. 2007–031, 2007), available at http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers; 
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Council then extended the scope of the OMC to the fields of poverty and social 
inclusion.60 Another OMC-like process on pensions started in 2001 and health care 
in 2004. The three distinct “social” OMCs were then streamlined into one OMC on 
social protection and inclusion in 2005.61  
The underlying idea of the Lisbon strategy was that competitiveness and social 
cohesion need not be a zero sum game, but should instead work together in a 
seamless process resulting in a knowledge-based economy with better jobs and 
social cohesion. The specific goal for social protection systems in the Lisbon context 
was “modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating 
social exclusion.”62 Far from being an impediment to growth, the Lisbon strategy 
now recognized social protection systems as the backdrop against which the 
transition towards a knowledge-based economy could be achieved. To attain this 
goal, however, Member States needed to pursue “active welfare policies,” and make 
sure their social protection systems were “sustainable,” especially in the face of an 
aging population.63  
The reactions to the social policy piece of the Lisbon agenda were widely 
varied, which goes to illustrate how, at that level of abstraction, the normative 
contents of the OMC were in the eye of the beholder. Some scholars argued that it 
did not constitute any deviation from the previous status quo in which the market-
making aspects of the European project had prevailed. Fritz Scharpf, for example, 
noted that even though the OMC remained the “best hope” for Social Europe, that 
hope was constrained to “optimizing the adjustment of social protection systems to 
market forces and fiscal constraints.”64 Chalmers and Lodge discussed the 
“colonization of the welfare state by the economic policy-making process.”65 
However, there were others, like Mary Daly, who noted that there were enough new 
elements in the Lisbon agenda that pointed in a more socially progressive direction, 
which, for the first time, made fighting poverty and social exclusion goals at the 
highest policy level.66 In addition, the OMC on social protection inaugurated with 
Lisbon allowed the inclusion of a wide variety of civil society actors, like anti-
 
 60 The Open Method of Coordination’s main characteristics were summarized by the Lisbon 
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poverty NGOs, to participate in the shaping of the EU agenda on social policy.67 
Even more enthusiastic observers called it a “Maastricht for Welfare.”68 
As the OMC process on social inclusion advanced, some more concrete goals 
for the social policies of Member States began to emerge. The 2004 Joint Report 
identified eight common challenges for Member States struggling with social 
exclusion and poverty.69 The first on the list continued to be the development of 
inclusive labor market policies that would promote employment, confirming the 
emphasis on employability as one of the main ways out of poverty in the 
Commission’s view. Far from a monodimensional emphasis on the markets as 
panacea, the OMC process on social inclusion seemed to be generating some policy 
goals closer to traditional concepts coming out of European welfare traditions, such 
as the need to guarantee adequate incomes.70 
B. The Relaunching of Lisbon and Markets as Welfare 
The co-existence of market aspects and state provisioning aspects in the social 
OMC, however, was short-lived. A round of revisions of the Lisbon strategy resulted 
in its so-called re-launch in 2005. Many observers characterized the re-launch as a 
toning down of the social goals and a prioritization of the flexibilization agenda in 
employment policy.71 Under the guidance of new Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso, the Lisbon strategy was revised to place more emphasis on the 
“jobs and growth” agenda. Even though the European Council continued to assert 
that the Lisbon strategy should “reinforce the European social model” with its 
emphasis on “full employment” and “social cohesion,” the revisions indicated a 
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belief that those goals would be best served by “raising the employment rate” along 
with “reform of the social protection” systems.72 
The overall goal of the re-launched Lisbon program was to fashion a European 
social model whose emphasis would be employment as the main route towards 
social inclusion, with an important role for public investment in education and skills, 
and a fight against excluding people from the labor markets. The Commission stated 
that the overarching objective was to fashion “adequate, accessible, financially 
sustainable, adaptable and efficient social protection systems and social inclusion 
policies” that would at the same time be compatible with the Union’s growth 
objectives.73  
The primacy of the fiscal sustainability imperative was evident in this 
reformulation of the OMC process. The Commission emphasized the central role of 
labor markets in providing basic welfare, the need for protecting the most 
marginalized through welfare, and the imperative of reforming pension systems with 
a view towards future sustainability. Reactions in the European Parliament against 
the shift in emphasis of the Lisbon re-launch were met with frank condescending 
paternalism by Commission President Barroso, who, in addressing the European 
Parliament avowed that he loved the social agenda just as well, but that the priority 
needed to be his “sick child,” that is, the stagnating economy.74  
C. The Pre-Crisis Emergence of Technocratic Social Europe 
Despite the Commission’s liberal use of the idea that the EU needed to protect 
“its” social model, Member States of the European Union had—and still have— 
dramatically different regimes of social protection.75 Thus, even as the Commission 
was discussing the need for the EU to modernize its social model, Member States’ 
welfare regimes fell under at least four distinct types of welfare provisioning with 
different degrees of reliance on the state, the market, and the family for the provision 
of basic welfare. As Esping Andersen has aptly shown, different types of welfare 
regimes in Europe entailed different degrees of de-commodification, namely the 
degree to which a specific regime allows individual workers to be free from pressure 
to commodify their labor in order to obtain their basic survival.76 They also relied on 
personal, family obligations to a different extent for the performance of basic care 
work, allowing different degrees of de-familialization for individual workers. 
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The Commission’s vision of modernized social protection regimes emerging out 
of the 2005 Communication entailed a combination of elements from two ideal 
types, the liberal and the social democratic. More specifically, the Commission’s 
most desirable reforms would mean intense dependency on labor markets for 
providing basic welfare, and therefore a low degree of de-commodification. Citizens 
of a state endowed with an OMC compliant social protection regime would have to 
look to markets first for the provisioning of basic needs. However, this would be 
tempered somewhat in the cases of individuals suffering from extreme poverty or 
marginalization, who would be the target of universal, means-tested benefits, aimed 
at correcting their disadvantage. Nonetheless, even in those cases, the goal would not 
be freeing the marginalized individual from the need to work, but rather assuring the 
resources necessary to transform them from marginalized citizen to employable 
participant in the labor market. Universal-style entitlements would be assured to 
marginalized groups and aging workers to make sure they could rebound and 
become employable individuals. 
On the other hand, the Commission’s ideal scheme would entail a degree of de-
familialization characteristic of social democratic regimes rather than liberal or 
corporatist/statist. This can be deduced from the emphasis on the need for increased 
labor participation of women in the marketplace. The need arises, of course, from the 
fiscal unsustainability of the current social protection regimes, according to the 
Commission, but the conclusion is inevitable. If women will be allowed to 
participate in the market in increasing numbers, for example, there will have to be 
some provision for child care either by the state or the market, at affordable rates, so 
that women can be free from care labor and become employable workers in the 
marketplace. 
This analysis illustrates that despite the rhetorical emphasis on the European 
social model, the project of social policy coordination towards the targets set by the 
Commission would entail a dramatic transformation of welfare regimes in various 
Member States. In some, entitlements would have to be pared down to the basics, 
sacrificing de-commodification for sustainability. In others, entitlements would have 
to be universalized and homogenized in order to allow individuals previously 
“trapped” in the family to emerge as employable individuals in the market. In all 
cases Member States would need to undertake dramatic reforms starting from 
distinct starting points. Thus, the concrete policy message of modernization of a 
European social model contained a basic tension: for current levels of protection to 
become sustainable, welfare regimes needed to be reformed. The direction of 
reforms, however, necessarily entailed a dramatic transformation of levels of 
protection towards re-commodification and de-familialization. 
This might not have been as problematic had the OMC process resulted in a 
truly bottom-up and democratic, rather than a technocratic consensus on required 
reforms. By many accounts the most successful aspect of the OMC process has been 
the “learning” aspect of the exercise amongst direct participants in the process, most 
of them state bureaucrats and academics.77 After more than a decade of repeated 
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rounds of consultation, the OMC was successful in generating a language of social 
policy at the European level, shared by policymakers and academics alike, 
discussing issues of poverty and social exclusion in the mode of concepts, statistical 
measurements, and aspirations generated by the OMC process and its sequels. This 
language defined the contours of the project of “Social Europe” as imagined by 
various institutional actors up until the crisis hit in 2008. 
Nonetheless, technocratic consensus was not enough. By 2008, right before the 
outbreak of the crisis, the Commission expressed frustration about the rhythm of 
reforms in the social policy coordination field. The 2008 Communication by the 
Commission on the need for reinforcement of the social OMC process noted that 
“more can and should be done,”78 especially in the domain of pension reforms. More 
specifically, it suggested borrowing benchmarking and targeting practices from other 
OMC processes such as employment, in order to improve implementation by 
national authorities of commonly agreed upon objectives.79 In other words, the 
Commission believed that the social OMC process had yielded consensus among the 
various actors on the desired direction of reforms, but the latter were stalling because 
of national politics. In terms of its own enforcement capacity, the Commission’s 
hands were tied. Despite the meager results on the ground, the desired reforms in 
systems of social protection, including pensions and healthcare, remained firmly in 
the domain of mere policy coordination. The Commission could, at best, help 
Member States continue the process of mutual learning and standard setting through 
the OMC process, without much capacity to force Member States into the desired 
reforms. 
Paradoxically, the Commission also seemed to understand that reform stalling 
was partly due to the need for more consensus building from the bottom up than was 
available at the time. It recognized that target setting in the Social OMC required 
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more consensus building and would probably be more gradual, involving Member 
States and other relevant “stakeholders.”80 The areas of consensus were still vague as 
to substantive content, but concise enough to allow the Commission to hold that 
more consensus building was necessary even as it was pushing for more reforms in 
the direction “agreed.” More specifically, the Commission could arguably rely on the 
consensus reached that after the crisis there was a need for radical reform for the 
sake of sustainability. Indeed, the crisis itself could be pointed to as evidence of the 
potential effects of failure to reform. As I will argue in the next section, this is 
exactly how the Commission framed the crisis in relationship to social policy 
reform. 
In the next section, I show how measures initially designed to deal with the debt 
sustainability of indebted countries were integrated into overall EU policy as 
necessary for everyone. Substantively they represented an accentuation of the 
neoliberal trend present since 2005. Procedurally, they entailed further competence 
creep in social policy through the new macroeconomic governance procedure and 
the fiscal sustainability imperative. 
IV. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE NEW SOCIAL EUROPE  
In this section I argue that the European Commission’s management of the crisis 
between 2009 and 2012 marks the latest significant episode of competence creep. 
Important social policy reforms, including pension and health care, moved from the 
domain of voluntary coordination through the OMC to the domain of strict loan 
conditionality for bailout countries, and eventually to the domain of enhanced 
economic policy coordination for every member of the euro zone. Thus, the EU 
emerged with enhanced capacity to twist the arms of Member States.81 The 
Commission repeatedly emphasized that interdependency between euro zone 
members and the possibility of spillover effects dictated the deepening of 
coordination in social policy. It also articulated a highly technocratic vision of 
reforms, seemingly removing previously contestable and highly contested policy 
goals from the political realm. 
I also argue that the vision for social policy reform that emerged from the 
Commission’s management of the crisis entails a one-size-fits-all recipe that 
collapses social policy into the need for generating growth and setting up jobs as the 
primary safety net. Gone is the Commission’s 2008 recognition that safety nets 
played an extremely important role in avoiding the marginalization of the most 
vulnerable immediately after the crisis hit, and its assertion that jobs in and of 
themselves do not necessarily lift people out of poverty. 
The first step in this process was the formulation of the Europe 2020 program in 
the spring of 2010.82 In Europe 2020, the Commission articulated its vision for 
“smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth.”83 The program was formulated against 
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the backdrop of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, and the Commission relied on this 
background to argue that more and deeper reforms of the kind previously 
recommended were needed for Europe to overcome the crisis. The second step in 
this process was the articulation of loan conditionality for Greece, Portugal, and 
Ireland in the loan agreements with the euro zone countries and the IMF. Developing 
the conditions and monitoring progress gave the Commission an opportunity to 
further articulate the types of reforms it considered necessary for growth. The vision 
emerging from the loan agreements is closely related to the neoliberal agenda for 
growth stemming from the OECD’s 1994 Jobs Study. The final step in the process 
was the carry over of lessons learned through the bailout management to the overall 
process of economic policy coordination for the euro zone in general. 
A. Europe 2020: Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth as Structural 
Adjustment 
In March 2010, in the full aftermath of the financial crisis, and at the still early 
stages of the sovereign debt crisis, the Commission announced the launch of the 
Europe 2020 project.84 According to the Commission, Europe 2020 set out “a vision 
of Europe’s social market economy for the 21st century” by pursuing the “mutually 
reinforcing” goals of attaining a “smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth.”85 The 
Europe 2020 program, with its two accompanying “flagship initiatives,”86 used the 
background of the global financial crisis to articulate a policy mix centered on 
employment markets as safety nets against poverty, conflating macro-economic 
stability with social policy. 
Commission President Barroso prefaced the announcement of the Europe 2020 
program with the following: 
- Economic realities are moving faster than political realities, as we have seen 
with the global impact of the financial crisis. We need to accept that the 
increased economic interdependence demands also a more determined and 
coherent response at the political level . . . . 
- [The crisis] has also exposed some fundamental truths about the challenges 
that the European economy faces . . . . How Europe responds will determine 
our future. 
- The crisis is a wake-up call, the moment where we recognise that “business 
as usual” would consign us to a gradual decline, to the second rank of the 
new global order. This is Europe’s moment of truth. It is the time to be bold 
and ambitious.87 
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Thus, Barroso stressed economic interdependence as the fact dictating the need 
for a more coherent response.88 He also pointed to the slow pace of previous 
reforms, making a plea for acceleration: 
Either we face up collectively to the immediate challenge of the recovery 
and to long-term challenges . . . . Or we continue at a slow and largely 
uncoordinated pace of reforms, and we risk ending up with a permanent 
loss in wealth, a sluggish growth rate (“sluggish recovery”) possibly 
leading to high levels of unemployment and social distress, and a relative 
decline on the world scene (“lost decade”).89 
The structural changes envisioned as necessary for achieving Europe 2020’s 
“inclusive growth” were largely focused on structural reform of labor markets and 
social protection regimes and aimed to achieve higher employment rates, while 
providing some basic levels of protection through “adequate access” to pensions and 
health services. Similar to prior articulations of policy goals after the 2005 re-launch 
of the Lisbon strategy, employment and social policy in Europe 2020 were 
subsumed under the economic policy goals. It was more or less assumed that once 
fiscal consolidation measures and structural reforms get going, those constitute 
sufficient employment and social policy by themselves, with the exception, perhaps, 
of special measures to deal with cases of extreme poverty and social exclusion. This 
is also why the Commission insisted on an “exit strategy” not from the crisis, but 
from the Keynesian (counter-cyclical) measures the crisis has forced Member States 
to adopt. 
Sound public finances are critical for restoring the conditions for 
sustainable growth and jobs so we need a comprehensive exit strategy. 
This will involve the progressive withdrawal of short-term crisis support 
and the introduction of medium to longer-term reforms that promote the 
sustainability of public finances and enhance potential growth: 
The Stability and Growth Pact provides the right framework to implement 
fiscal exit strategies and Member States are setting down such strategies in 
their stability and convergence programmes.90 The degree to which 
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employment and social policy implications are derived from this position 
on macro-economic sustainability is evident: fiscal consolidation and 
long-term financial sustainability will need to go hand in hand with 
important structural reforms, in particular of pension, health care, social 
protection and education systems. Public administration should use the 
situation as an opportunity to enhance efficiency and the quality of 
service.91 
Growth and macro economic stability, in other words, imposed nothing less than 
the complete reform of existing basic structures of public administration and social 
protection in Member States, with the paradoxical purpose of assuring the 
“sustainability of our social models.”92 As was the case before the crisis, if Member 
States were to fully pursue the structural reforms recommended here, they would end 
up with a different set of necessary structural reforms. Some would need to upgrade 
the level of protection provided, expanding coverage to everyone at some basic 
level, whilst others would need to reduce levels of entitlement downwards. In all 
cases, however, “public administration should use the situation as an opportunity to 
enhance efficiency and the quality of service.”93 This is a policy goal that would be 
further elaborated by the Commission in the process of the annual economic policy 
coordination and would be used to introduce “good governance” ideas and indicators 
into European governance. 
Even the term “inclusive growth” entails a certain conflation of the economic 
goal of achieving growth with the social goal of having an inclusive society. Notice 
the Commission’s fleshing out of the term. The Commission defined inclusive 
growth as “fostering a high-employment economy delivering economic, social and 
territorial cohesion.”94 According to the Commission, participation in the labor 
markets and access to the labor markets remained the main goal of an inclusive 
society: 
Inclusive growth means empowering people through high levels of 
employment, investing in skills, fighting poverty and modernising labour 
markets, training and social protection systems so as to help people 
anticipate and manage change, and build a cohesive society . . . . It is 
about ensuring access and opportunities for all throughout the lifecycle. 
Europe needs to make full use of its labour potential to face the challenges 
of an ageing [sic] population and rising global competition. Policies to 
promote gender equality will be needed to increase labour force 
participation thus adding to growth and social cohesion.95 
Social protection systems had to be modernized. The resulting modernization 
would not guarantee the safety net that allows for some degree of de-
commodification of labor,96 as it traditionally had in the social democratic welfare 
regimes, but rather would offer a guarantee against deprivation whilst the 
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worker/citizen performs her duty to re-skill and bounce back into the labor market 
“through the lifecycle”—or, to quote Tom Waits, “forevermore.” 
Thus, inclusive growth in the Europe 2020 initiative entails a fusion of 
employment and social policy goals, with the understanding that they are mutually 
reinforcing. Gone is the 2008 realization by the Commission that “higher growth and 
more jobs have in themselves not been sufficient to achieve the hoped-for results in 
terms of poverty reduction and improvement of the circumstances of the most 
vulnerable.”97 Instead, the 2010 Commission was back to emphasizing that 
“restoring economic growth with more and better jobs will be the key to fight against 
poverty.”98 
This conflation is also obvious in the choice of the two Flagship Initiatives (EU 
lingo for EU funded programs) to support the struggle for inclusive growth, one on 
Skills and Jobs and the other on Poverty and Social exclusion.99 The Skills and Jobs 
initiative has as its goal “modernising labour markets with a view to raising 
employment levels and ensuring the sustainability of our social models.”100 Ensuring 
the sustainability of social models in turn means that, “Member States will need to 
implement their national pathways for flexicurity . . . to reduce labour market 
segmentation and facilitate transitions as well as reconciliation of work and family 
life.”101 More than that, they will need to promote active aging policies, to promote 
continuous labor force training, and to reform their tax systems so as not to 
discourage job creation through high taxes on labor and the self-employed.102  
In its 2010 Communication elaborating on the Agenda on Skills and Jobs, the 
Commission added that Member States needed to improve the “business 
environment” in order to support job creation. This included finding ways to ease 
administrative and legal obstacles to hiring and firing and to reduce non-wage labor 
costs.103 This directive was in tension with Europe 2020’s initial instruction to 
Member States to “[p]romote and monitor the effective implementation of social 
dialogue outcomes.”104 The reason for the tension is that many of the legal obstacles 
to hiring and firing were the legally binding results of collective agreements, which 
were themselves outcomes of social dialogue. During the Commission’s work on the 
conditionality of the loans to Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, the tension between 
these two goals, both part of Europe 2020, became even more evident.105 
The initial articulation of the Platform Against Poverty in Europe 2020 entailed 
basic support for a safety net (including adequate income support and access to 
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health care), especially for “groups at particular risk.”106 Even though this initial 
elaboration of the Platform could be plausibly construed as favorable to traditional 
notions of solidarity coming from continental welfare regimes, the Commission 
Communication on the program published later in 2010 refocused the agenda on 
employment as the main motor for avoiding poverty and social exclusion. The 
Commission asserted that “[r]estoring economic growth with more and better jobs 
will be the key to the fight against poverty.”107 And, even more plainly, the 
Commission noted, “Getting a job is the safest route out of poverty for those who 
can work.”108  
Admittedly, access to employment needed to be complemented with access to 
social protection and essential services, such as health care. A closer look at the 
elaboration of these points in the Platform reveals, however, that when talking about 
access to such services, the Commission repeatedly shifted attention from access for 
existing populations to access for future generations. This move turned a discussion 
of a universal entitlement into a discussion about the fiscal sustainability of the 
same. The Commission analyzed pensions systems as “crucial for tackling elderly 
poverty.” However, the discussion soon became one of fiscal sustainability: 
[T]he rapid ageing [sic] of Europe’s population is having wide-ranging 
impacts on all types of pension schemes and gives unprecedented urgency 
to the agenda for reforms . . . . The key to adequate and sustainable 
pensions in the future is ‘active ageing’ [sic] which implies in particular 
creating conditions that allow older workers to remain longer on the 
labour market.109 
The need for future sustainability then dictated the necessary reforms: longer 
working lives combined with a paring down of entitlements to levels low enough to 
be able to sustain future generations. The discussion on access to health care services 
also emphasized the need for increased efficiency of health systems, given the 
budget pressures on Member States. 
At no point did this policy entrenchment of employment market primacy deter 
the Commission from invoking the idea of Social Europe. In fact, defending 
European social models became the main justification for the pursuit of the same 
structural reforms that would dramatically alter them and in some cases, dismantle 
them: 
[O]ur exit from the crisis must be the point of entry into a new economy. 
For our own and future generations to continue to enjoy a high-quality of 
healthy life, underpinned by Europe’s unique social models, we need to 
take action now.110 
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Welfare regimes were credited by the Commission with having helped people 
deal with the effects of the global financial crisis.111 Yet, they were simultaneously 
criticized for their rigidity and lack of adaptability to the global economy, to the 
extent that they allowed unemployed people to rely on state transfers rather than 
return to the labor market for a job, even at a reduced wage. This tension became 
evident in the Commission’s elaboration of “activation measures” in the Irish loan 
conditionality. The activation measures envisioned included removing minimum 
wage protections that had served as automatic stabilizers in the face of the global 
financial crisis because they allowed unemployed workers to remain happily 
unemployed instead of seeking a lower-wage job to deal with the crisis.112  
B. Structural Adjustment in Loan Conditionality  
The next stage in the Commission’s policy elaboration through crisis-
management came with the Economic Adjustment Programs (EAPs) of euro 
countries seeking bailouts from other euro zone countries and the IMF. The EAPs 
included strict conditionality for each borrowing country. The Commission 
participated in the elaboration of conditionality for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as a 
representative of the euro zone creditor countries. Notably, structural reforms in 
labor law, privatizations, and an overhaul of inefficient public sectors became the 
focal points of the program conditionality. These reforms were partly justified on the 
basis of their potential for spurring growth in borrowing countries, but also on their 
potential for enhancing social equity. Thus, they were not limited to borrowing 
countries, which had to urgently deal with their competitiveness problem through 
internal devaluation. Rather the implication of the conditionality in the EAPs was 
that they included a recipe for growth, one that also conformed with social equity, 
and could, therefore, be followed elsewhere in Europe. Thus, the Commission put 
forth structural adjustment as a recipe for growth in its elaboration of loan 
conditionality for borrowing countries. 
It should be noted that the idea of structural adjustment in the form of labor 
flexibilization has been challenged as a one-size-fits-all recipe for growth. The 
OECD originally introduced the idea that labor regulation was largely to blame for 
high levels of unemployment in developed countries.113 International financial 
institutions adopted labor reform recommendations calling for labor market 
deregulation as part of their loan programs with developing countries.114 The next 
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decade of research, however, revealed, at best, ambivalent results about the 
relationship between labor market flexibilization and unemployment.115 The 
discussion shifted from labor deregulation as a pre-requisite to growth to 
establishing appropriate labor market institutions as a pre-requisite to growth.116 
After more than a decade of policy recommendations and reforms the OECD 
reviewed and significantly revised its original Jobs Strategy Report.117 According to 
the 2006 revision, highly concentrated collective bargaining systems tended to 
achieve lower unemployment.118 This is a surprising reversal given the originally 
unequivocal recommendation to decentralize collective bargaining for the sake of 
growth and employment. In its 2006 revision, the OECD insisted that collective 
bargaining could still result in downward wage rigidities but urged that “it would be 
useful to take fuller account of the fact that national industrial relations structures 
and practices are part of the social and political fabric, implying that bargaining 
structures are not easily changed by government action.”119 Equally importantly, the 
2006 revision noted that “the effect of E[mployment] P[rotection] L[egislation] on 
overall unemployment is probably small.”120 This was a far cry from the former 
casual observation that countries with “stringent legislation generally have a high 
rate of long-term unemployment.”121 Even more importantly, the OECD seemed to 
admit that the famous Anglo-Saxon model with low benefits and low investment in 
training programs for the unemployed yielded the same results as a system with 
generous unemployment benefits along with active labor market programs.122 
Finally, the 2006 report observed that even though simple economic rationality 
suggests that minimum wages would lead to less output and less job creation, the 
evidence was “mixed” and “ambiguous.”123 The World Bank’s own review of the 
literature in 2013 confirmed these more nuanced findings, exonerating labor market 
institutions from blanket condemnation.124 
Despite these developments, the EU took a definite turn towards the 
entrenchment of ideas of labor market flexibility as both a culprit of inefficient 
“rigidities” and a potential locus for reforms through its crisis management. This 
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section describes how labor market flexibilization became the centerpiece of loan 
conditionality for the sake of both growth and equity. The conditionality of the loans 
to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, pushed the concept of “labor market activation 
measures” into uncharted territory by equating the dismantling of unemployment 
protection with activation measures. Crisis management reinforced the idea that 
labor institutions created wage “rigidities” and broadened the conditionality of the 
loans in “good governance” directions.125  
1. Labor Flexibilization for Growth 
Greece signed two loan agreements each accompanied by an Economic 
Adjustment Program (EAPGr1 and EAPGr2). Portugal and Ireland signed one loan 
agreement each, accompanied again by their respective Economic Adjustment 
Programs (EAPPort and EAPIr). Each of these programs came with strict 
conditionality, heavily relying on market flexibilization as a recipe for growth. 
EAPGr1 declared that beyond the short-term goal of fiscal adjustment, that is, 
austerity, the goal of the Program was to spur export-led growth and foreign-
investment in the medium term: 
In parallel with short-term anti-crisis fiscal measures, there is a need to 
prepare and implement an ambitious structural reform agenda to 
strengthen external competitiveness, accelerate reallocation of resources 
from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, and foster growth. Structural 
reforms that boost the economy’s capacity to produce, to save and to 
export are critical for the success of the programme and recovery of the 
economy. Reforms are, in particular, needed to modernize the public 
sector, to render product and labour markets more efficient and flexible, 
and to create a more open and accessible business environment for 
domestic and foreign investors, including a reduction of the state’s direct 
participation in domestic industries. The deep structural reforms foreseen 
in the programme, including reform of public management, will not only 
help address current challenges but will also boost growth prospects in the 
medium and long run.126 
As this quote illustrates, the scope of the required reforms was quite sweeping 
from the beginning. Beyond a “modernization” of the public sector, the reforms 
included a “flexibilization” agenda in regard to product and labor markets, as well as 
far-reaching privatizations. This program bore sure marks of similarity to an 
understanding of growth that came out of international development institutions 
during the 1990s. With regards to the labor reform more specifically, EAPGr1 
echoed the 1994 OECD Jobs Study flexibilization agenda rather than the 2006 
revision.127 EAPGr1 noted that labor market reforms would “spur job creation and 
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increase wage flexibility.”128 It also affirmed that conditionality was carefully chosen 
to prioritize those reforms that would boost growth and jobs.129 EAPPort also 
included similar labor market reforms; although the word labor flexibilization was 
carefully avoided.130 More importantly, even though the Commission recognized that 
Ireland already had flexible labor markets, it advised further reforms.131  
2. Labor Flexibilization for Social Equity 
The conditionality of the first Greek loan was designed mostly by IMF staff.132 
Nonetheless, a concern with “social” effects of the program can be discerned in 
several places. Specifically, the program provided for the establishment of a 
universal minimal-entitlement, for every elderly citizen without means, so as to 
strengthen minimum social safety nets. It also urged a revision of the existing safety 
net with a view to better targeting entitlements towards the weakest citizens. For 
countries like Greece, this might have been a welcome reform in the direction of 
stronger public safety net institutions had it not been imposed in the middle of a 
crippling recession made worse by the austerity cuts. More importantly, labor market 
reforms were touted as central for reasons of “equity,” as they were thought to 
increase job opportunities for the young and the long-term unemployed: 
Labour market reforms will spur job creation and increase wage flexibility 
. . . . Other than efficiency aspects, reforms are also needed to improve 
equity, therefore increasing job opportunities for young and long term 
[sic] unemployed and improving access to services.133 
The idea that equity for the most vulnerable groups, including the youth and 
women, demanded a dismantling of labor protection for those already employed was 
thus an early part of the Commission’s elaboration of conditionality. The 
Commission explicitly attributed difficulties of the youth, women and the long-term 
unemployed in entering the market to increased levels of employment protection 
legislation for both temporary and permanent workers.134  
This idea would eventually make it to the broader process of economic policy 
coordination for euro zone countries. Its basis is some empirical evidence that 
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suggests that when a labor market combines strong employment protections for the 
currently employed and very few protections for temporary contract workers it 
incentivizes the substitution of permanent jobs with temporary contracts, rendering 
precarious the conditions of the most under-privileged groups.135 The necessity of 
such reforms as a general policy guideline, however, is highly doubtful, especially 
since there is also empirical evidence showing that strong levels of employment 
protection combined with other labor market institutions such as activation measures 
can result in equally dynamic labor markets.136  
More importantly, the identification of equity concerns with less labor 
protection that began developing in the loan conditionality entailed a collapse of the 
idea of social equity into the idea of equal access to markets for the sale of one’s 
labor. 
3. Dismantling Welfare as an Activation Measure 
Ireland became the second EU Member State to ask for a bailout in November 
2010. The conditionality for Ireland’s bailout warrants some analysis because it too 
conditioned the disbursement of the loan tranches upon performance of labor market 
reforms, despite Ireland’s avowed “labour market flexibility,” which had led its 
adjustment to be already well under way.137 In addition, Ireland’s crisis had been 
caused by a banking bubble and a rescue of the banking sector after the bubble burst, 
and not by the accumulation of public debt through the public wage bill.138 
Distinguishing between labor market reforms that supposedly led to the crisis and 
labor market reforms that would help the country exit the crisis through downward 
adjustment of wages and prices—internal devaluation—was therefore easier. In 
Ireland’s case, there were no such supposed rigidities predating the crisis and the 
conditionality of the program acknowledged that “Ireland has a good track record 
regarding the flexibility of its labour market and is recognised to provide an 
attractive business environment.”139 Nonetheless, the structural reforms demanded of 
Ireland focused on the labor market, and specifically on minimum wage, 
unemployment protection, and activation measures. 
The EAPIr’s first reason for wanting to lower minimum wages was the goal of 
internal devaluation. More specifically, despite the downward adjustment of wages 
since the bursting of the bubble, the Commission found that Ireland’s real wages had 
actually increased, despite cuts, because of the dramatic drop in prices. However, 
demand had not dropped sufficiently to restore Irish current account imbalances 
through a drop in imports, regardless of whether wages had contributed to the initial 
problem. 
More importantly, the Commission thought that minimum wages might be 
affecting labor demand for the low-skilled workers who had been suffering most 
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from unemployment since the construction bubble burst. However, this argument for 
reducing minimum wages was not proven anywhere; the Commission simply 
referred the reader to a chart showing that the unemployment figures were worst 
amongst the low-skilled since the crisis. This was accompanied by a chart showing 
that Ireland had the second highest minimum wage requirements after Luxembourg 
and a footnote explaining that even though Ireland’s minimum wage was not as high 
a percentage of the Irish average wage, it was high in terms of employers’ potential 
labor costs. In other words, the downward shift in minimum wage was mandated by 
the unproven idea that its change might spur employment for the low-skilled and the 
more obvious goal of inducing cost convergence through internal devaluation.140  
Another interesting characteristic of the Irish program was the complete 
conflation of labor activation measures with a reduction in unemployment 
protection. Before the crisis, “activation measures” in the OMC process often 
referred to positive action, such as retraining programs and re-skilling for the 
purpose of allowing unemployed workers to re-enter the labor market. In the Irish 
program, the reduction in severance payments and unemployment protection 
recommended appeared as itself part of the “activation” measures envisioned by the 
EAPIr. Given that activation in labor markets is one of the main components of the 
Europe 2020 program and the Commission’s vision on how to enhance employment, 
it warrants some analysis. According to the Irish EAP, Ireland needed to decrease its 
levels of unemployment protection and “increase incentives to accept job offers.”141 
In other words, the degree of de-commodification of labor allowed by the Irish 
unemployment protection legislation was seen as an obstacle to growth and to 
increased participation rates in employment. 
Here is how the Adjustment Program articulated the benefits of lowering 
minimum wage protections and other regulated wages: 
A reduction in the minimum wage and a review of the framework for 
other regulated wages will exert downward pressure on wages both 
directly and through spill-over effects. Stylised simulations carried out for 
the Irish economy by D’Auria et al. (2009) . . . show that, after 10 years, a 
decline in nominal wages of 0.6% leads to a 0.3% increase in employment 
and a 0.2% increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario of no policy 
change. A decrease in the unemployment benefit replacement rate is also 
likely to have sizeable effects on employment and output. In a scenario 
where the unemployment benefit replacement rate is reduced by 5 
percentage points, total employment increases by 1% and GDP by 0.7% 
after 10 years relative to the baseline. The measure is particularly 
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beneficial for low-skilled workers, whose employment rate increases by 
1.8%.142 
Beyond its conflation of activation measures with reduced wages and lesser 
unemployment protections, this paragraph warrants analysis because of its conflation 
of an expected welfare-enhancing benefit for the economy (more employment) with 
its distribution among workers. The overall benefit for the economy through 
increased employment (by 1%) and increased output (by 0.7%) is thoroughly 
conflated with the benefit to individual low-skilled workers, who might otherwise 
have felt themselves better off with prior protections in place. Assuming the results 
of this study are true, which suggests that such measures could be potentially overall 
welfare-enhancing (not spectacularly so, though), the distributional effects over 
specific segments of the working population are actually obscured. Will the low-
skilled workers whose minimum wages and unemployment protections have been 
reduced be better off because more of them can now occupy those same jobs, but 
with lower wages and lesser protections? This is a question that the Adjustment 
Programs promoted through the Memoranda of Understanding, and which all three 
peripheral countries tend to answer in the affirmative with an appeal to economic 
expertise. From the perspective of the low-skilled workers of Europe, though, this 
could be described as a “fundamental change” in the social contract through the 
“technocratic” backdoor. 143 
4. Labor “Rigidities” and the Technocratic Competence Creep 
EAPGr1 stepped over the division of competences between the EU and the 
Member States in question regarding labor policy, and disregarded the tension 
between compliance with the conditionality and Greek collective bargaining rights. 
EAPGr1 made it clear that a horizontal wage reduction in the private sector was not 
included in the program’s conditionality, in contrast with public sector wages, which 
were significantly cut. However, the fact that the Commission, as manager of the 
loan on behalf of the euro area countries, was mandating the reduction of wages in 
any sector was unheard of in EU law, where wage policy was thought of as set 
independently by each Member State within the “soft” constraints of economic and 
employment policy coordination at EU level. 
The fact that this mandate was imposed in the context of a loan program to 
Greece does not change its importance or its potential significance for labor policy in 
other Member States. Labor “rigidities” were seen as a causal factor in 
unemployment, and removing them was seen as a potential technocratic tool in 
fighting unemployment. Thus, minimum wage policies and employment protection 
legislation, the product of intense political negotiations and compromises in each 
country, were presented as a technical obstacle to growth with macroeconomic 
significance for the entire euro area. If rigid labor law hindered the downward 
adjustment in wages, then it contributed to divergences in competitiveness among 
euro area members, which, in turn, contributed to the destabilization of the euro area 
financial system through current account imbalances. Arguably, this was then an 
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area ripe for EU intervention, despite concerns about the division of competences 
between the EU and Member States, and despite concerns about respective national 
labor relations systems. Indeed, the regulations on the monitoring of macroeconomic 
indicators, which were adopted a year later, incorporated unit labor costs on the 
monitored scoreboard. This arguably has opened the way for the Commission to 
supervise Member State labor law and impose fines in case it turns out such labor 
law imposes “rigidities.” Thus, labor law and even collective bargaining rights have 
firmly entered the realm of economic governance in the EU. 
In the case of the EAPGr1, the lack of worry about interfering with national 
collective bargaining traditions was quite extraordinary. The program gestured 
towards “the sensitivity of labour market and wage reforms,” announcing that the 
Greek government would take a two-step approach to deal with such sensitivity.144 
The first step would be to try and convince social partners (the Greek unions) to 
agree to the decentralization of wage bargaining, to the revision of important aspects 
of the rules on hiring and firing, and to the revision of part time and temporary work 
regulations.145 The second step would be to simply enforce the required changes 
despite lack of agreement146 and contravention to then existing labor law.147 Indeed, 
the specific conditionality of the Memorandum of Understanding between Greece 
and its creditors foresaw that “[f]ollowing dialogue with social partners, the 
government proposes and parliament adopts legislation to reform wage bargaining 
system [sic] in the private sector,” along with a slew of other basic changes in Greek 
labor law.148 EAPGr2 included these labor reforms in the tiny list of Greek 
accomplishments since the first loan: 
Since the social dialogue between and with private sector employers’ and 
employees’ representatives did not deliver a satisfactory outcome, the 
Government legislated a reduction in minimum wages in the private sector 
and a modification of number [sic] of wage-setting procedures, including 
the rules on the expiration of collective agreements and the arbitration of 
wage disputes . . . . Moreover the government committed to take 
additional corrective measures to facilitate collective bargaining and 
ensure wage flexibility and higher employment.149 
By comparison, the Portuguese program’s conditionality—agreed to almost a 
year later—was not as exacting in the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment mandated. 
Nonetheless, the content of the substantive reforms envisioned by the program’s 
conditionality were remarkably similar in the labor law domain. Portugal undertook 
reform of its employment protection legislation and its wage-setting mechanisms 
with a view towards improving market-driven adjustments to labor costs, among 
other things.  
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This also meant dramatic changes in its traditional labor relations: revise the 
unemployment insurance system to reduce the risk of long-term unemployment 
while strengthening social safety nets; reform employment protection legislation to 
tackle labour market segmentation, foster job creation, and ease the transition of 
workers across occupations, firms, and sectors; ease working time arrangements to 
contain employment fluctuations over the cycle, better accommodate differences in 
work patterns across sectors and firms, and enhance firms’ competitiveness; promote 
labour cost developments consistent with job creation and enhanced 
competitiveness; ensure good practices and appropriate resources to Active Labour 
Market Policies to improve the employability of the young and disadvantaged 
categories and ease labour market mismatches. 150  
The rhetorical nonchalance as to the conditionality’s conformity with existing 
EU law was thus somewhat less pronounced. In fact, the program gave assurances 
that social partners would be consulted in the process and reforms would take place 
in accordance with EU Directives and Core Labour Standards.151 The overall 
language of the program was more recognizably “EU-ian” than the Greek program, 
using, as of 1997, the familiar “employability” and active labor market vocabulary 
and conditioning the loan on the “strengthening” of social safety nets.152 
Nonetheless, it also had the sure mark of the flexibilization programs promoted 
through international development institutions. Several aspects of the changes 
imposed as conditionality for the Portuguese program were challenged in front of the 
Portuguese Supreme Court and found to be unconstitutional.153  
5. Good Governance Comes Home to Roost  
Another notable characteristic of some of the EAPs was the gradual turn 
towards including more and more conditions that had little to do with the immediate 
problem of austerity and the budget, but that were instead understood to promote 
long-term growth. EAPGr1 focused primarily on the labor market, the product and 
service market, and financial reform. All of these envisioned reforms could be tied to 
the overall goal of austerity, internal devaluation, and the sustainability of the Greek 
public debt. EAPIr focused on labor market reforms almost exclusively, even though 
the Commission noted that a revision of state owned assets with a view towards 
privatization should be considered. EAPPort contained a much more expansive range 
of required reforms. The Commission characterized them as “structural” reforms 
aimed at “improving framework conditions” for growth.154 Part of the program bore 
intense similarities to the judicial and legal reforms recommended by the World 
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Bank through its Doing Business program.155 They included judicial reform and the 
easing of the regulatory burden for “doing business.”156  
The EAPGr2 was particularly expansive in this regard. In fact, a subsequent 
IMF report on conditionality of loans in general noted that the Fund should be 
careful “to continue to scrutinize the macro-criticality of certain conditions in these 
programs, particularly given the large number of conditions in non-core areas (e.g., 
judicial reform and competition policy).”157 Interestingly, it seems that the IMF on 
this occasion thought that the expansive conditions were the result of the Fund’s 
collaboration with “institutions with broader mandates than the Fund.”158 This is 
quite striking, because the public administration and judicial reform conditions were 
explained by the Commission as necessary for growth, but the majority of the 
conditions fell outside the purview of the Commission’s legislative competence. 
Thus, good governance indicators entered European policy coordination, which 
itself left the domain of “new governance” through soft law and started becoming 
harder, first for the borrowing countries through conditionality, and later through the 
inclusion of some of these broader reform goals into the European Semester.159  
 C. Structural Adjustment in Post-Crisis Economic Governance 
The Europe 2020 framework inaugurated a new phase in economic policy 
coordination called the European Semester. Substantively, the first three rounds of 
the European Semester, in 2011, 2012, and 2013, reveal a carry-over of loan 
conditionality into the overall process of policy coordination within the euro zone. 
Procedurally, fiscal coordination now implies obligatory reform in domains such as 
labor, social, and tax policy, previously outside the grasp of EU legislative capacity. 
1. The Collapse of Social Policy into Economic Governance  
The main goal of labor market reform is to induce more people to enter the labor 
market, through shifts in tax and benefit systems, some of which had thus far worked 
“to protect people relatively well from income poverty, but [which] provide[d] weak 
incentives and/or little support for the labour market participation of those furthest 
away from the labour market.”160 Notably such labor market reform is also the main 
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reform aimed at reducing social exclusion and poverty, further entrenching the 
collapse of social policy into economic policy.161  
Observe some of the European Commission’s main recommendations for how 
Europe could return to a “job-rich recovery”: 
[L]imit the tax burden on labour, notably for the low-paid, as part of 
broader efforts to shift tax burden away from labour[;] . . . continue 
modernising labour markets by simplifying employment legislation and 
developing flexible working arrangements, including short-time working 
arrangements and work environments conducive to longer working lives. . 
. . monitor the effect of wage-setting systems, in particular indexation 
mechanisms, and if necessary . . . amend them, respecting national 
consultation practices, in order to better reflect productivity developments 
and support job creation. It is important that minimum wage levels strike 
the right balance between employment creation and adequate income.162 
Even though the Commission denies that its recommendations constitute a one-
size-fits-all recipe for growth, the substantive contents of its overall goals reveal a 
strong reliance on the idea that labor market “rigidities” can be blamed for loss of 
competitiveness, as well as an insistence on the idea that flexibilization in the guise 
of loosening worker protections will lead to job creation.163  
Discussion of pension reforms and health care reform seems to have now firmly 
passed under the “fiscal consolidation” side of economic policy coordination, which 
means that the EU now has increased enforcement tools regarding these policies too. 
In the 2012 round, the Commission was recommending the following: 
Pursuing the reform and modernisation of pension systems, respecting 
national traditions of social dialogue to ensure the financial sustainability 
and adequacy of pensions, by aligning the retirement age with increasing 
life expectancy, restricting access to early retirement schemes, supporting 
longer working lives, equalising the pensionable age between men and 
women and supporting the development of complementary private savings 
to enhance retirement incomes. This modernisation should be coupled 
with a reform of health systems aiming at cost-efficiency and 
sustainability.164 
The Commission proposed the inclusion of macro-economic indicators in the 
process of fiscal surveillance precisely because of the systemic importance of certain 
policy choices that fell under Member State competence such as labor law: 
Overcoming these challenges in the euro area is of paramount importance, 
and urgent, in order to secure stability and sustained and employment 
creating growth. Addressing these challenges requires strengthened and 
closer policy co-ordination including: 
A framework for deeper and broader surveillance for euro area countries: 
in addition to strengthening fiscal discipline, macro-economic imbalances 
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and competitiveness developments should be an integral part of economic 
surveillance, in particular with a view to facilitating a policy driven 
adjustment.165 
The Commission has thus introduced the idea that macro-economic surveillance 
and competitiveness are areas of core EU competence having to do with the 
economic policy coordination of the euro zone, even though legislative capacity in 
macro-important domains had remained largely with the Member States. 
2. Enhanced Macro-Economic Surveillance and Social Policy 
Both the Commission and the Council treated the sovereign debt crisis as 
evidence of the need for closer policy supervision of Member States. The Greek 
scenario drove home the idea that the EU needed to have more tools in the toolkit for 
controlling national budgets. The measures adopted on this front included the so-
called six-pack, a package of five regulations and one directive.166  
On the fiscal surveillance side, the regulations reinforce preventative 
supervision of the Member States’ application of the SGP and, more importantly, 
allow the imposition of fines in cases of Member State non-compliance. The stricter 
application of the SGP has obvious indirect implications for Member States’ 
capacity to use counter-cyclical deficit spending in times of economic recession and, 
therefore, impacts their capacity to use deficit spending as employment policy. 
Currently, all but four of the European Union Member States are in an excessive 
deficit procedure initiated by the Commission, which means that they are all 
mandated to take budget constraining measures to reduce deficit and debt levels.167 
Each country has a different composition of debt and deficit, as well as different 
capacities for reducing spending without hurting basic safety nets. But in all cases, 
the impact of mandated austerity for everyone in the European Union means 
constrained capacity to spend on employment and social policy measures. 
Cumulatively, this means that the European Union is pursuing policies that have 
already led to an economic downward spiral as both public and private sectors in all 
Member States try to save. 
This is not all, however. The six-pack includes two new regulations mimicking 
the fiscal surveillance process, but this time with a view towards preventing and then 
correcting macro-economic imbalances. The regulations operate on the basis of a 
scoreboard of indicators tracking the development of key macroeconomic 
characteristics in each Member State. A deviation from the target levels for macro 
indicators triggers an in-depth review by the Commission, which can even include 
IMF-style “missions” to the Member States under review. The Commission can then 
suggest corrective courses of action for the Member States. Non-compliance with the 
suggestions can eventually lead to a fine equal to 0.1% of GDP for refusing to 
comply with the Commission’s recommendations.168  
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From a substantive perspective, the two macro-regulations explicitly encompass 
surveillance of a Member State’s “main economic policy areas,” including “fiscal 
and wage policies, labour markets, product and services markets and financial sector 
regulation.”169 Regarding labor market surveillance, the relevant scoreboard 
indicator chosen is the rate of change in unit labor costs of each Member State. 
Despite provisos incorporated into the macro-regulations in the six-pack about 
according “full respect” to national parliaments and social partners (i.e., unions) as 
well as to differences in systems of “wage formation,” it is hard to see how that will 
happen when the Commission in its macro-surveillance role recommends lowering 
unit labor costs in order to comply with the European Semester process. As Daniel 
Gros notes, “one legacy of the euro crisis thus is that competitiveness indicators now 
play a key role in the economic governance of the euro zone.”170 With respect to 
labor policy, this implies that the EU now has a lot to say about wage setting in 
Member States, and has even acquired a financial pressure mechanism for 
enforcement. 
It will be interesting to see how far the Commission will be willing to go in its 
future enforcement of labor related “macro-economic imbalances.” There is already 
some indication that it is willing to test the ground of such top-down governance in 
domains as politically sensitive as labor reforms. In its 2012 country specific 
recommendations to France, the Council recommendation noted that France should 
ensure that “any development in the minimum wage is supportive of employment, 
especially of low skilled and inexperienced workers.”171 Translation: France should 
reduce, or not further increase, minimum wages because this creates disincentives 
for employers to hire low-skilled workers. Similarly, the Commission noted that, 
“some aspects of the unemployment benefit system for older workers (duration) may 
provide limited incentives to work.”172 This quote does not need much translation; it 
is evidently aimed at reducing unemployment benefits for the elderly so as to 
“activate” them. The Council recommendation noted that France was one of the 
countries for which an in-depth review of its macro-indicators had been deemed 
necessary and that macro-economic imbalances had been observed even though they 
had not been deemed excessive. Excessive imbalances trigger the correlative 
correction process, which can ultimately lead to the imposition of fines for non-
compliance. 
3. Fiscal Supervision Goes Rogue: The European Semester as a Good Governance 
Project  
The European Semester starts with an Annual Growth Survey (AGS) published 
by the Commission. The AGS contains overall guidelines for the European 
economy, as well as specific recommendations for the Member States. These 
recommendations are no longer merely theoretical. They can be accompanied by the 
 
 169 Council Regulation 1176/2011, Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 
O.J. (L 306) 25 (EC) (discussing Regulation (EU) No.1174/2011 of November 16, 2011, on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area). 
 170 Gros, supra note 35, at 1. 
 171 Council Recommendation on the National Reform Programme 2012 of France and Delivering a 
Council Opinion on the Stability Programme of France 2012–2016, 2012 O.J. (C 219) 31 (EC), at 14. 
 172 Id. 
70 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW [Vol. 20.1 
enforcement measures described in the previous section. The Commission’s 
recommendations in the context of this newly established annual process of policy 
coordination are thoroughly aligned with the substantive requirements of the EAPs 
for Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. Finally, a review of the AGSs highlights the 
expansive understanding the Commission has developed through this crisis about the 
extent of desirable reforms for the sake of growth. 
According to the Commission, “the EU needs to use this crisis to address 
decisively the issues of its global competitiveness,”173 and more bluntly, “Europe can 
use the crisis to trigger a profound transformation of its economic structure.”174 This 
means close integration of economic surveillance and monitoring of policy 
reform.175 The recommended economic reforms now range from labor market 
flexibilization, to pension reforms, to improvements in the business environment 
through judicial reforms and the reduction of administrative burdens. Reform in 
taxation also featured prominently in the 2012 round of the European Semester, with 
a special section dedicated to it. The 2012 AGS also included a whole section on 
“modernizing public administration.” The Commission emphasized that the Member 
States needed “well-performing administrations to be able to play their full role in 
the EU, to meet their obligations and to ensure that their citizens can benefit fully 
from the advantages of EU membership.”176 Just as in the terms of the EAPs for 
Greece and Portugal, as well in other good governance projects in the past, the 
Commission suggested that several Member States needed to enhance their civil 
justice systems to resolve conflicts more expediently.177 
4. Tensions Between Pre and Post-Crisis Social Europe 
Despite the Commission’s efforts to present its reform agenda as a coherent 
whole, important tensions between different policy areas within the AGS could also 
be discerned. Some of them related to the contrast between the permeating concern 
with speedy fiscal consolidation and structural reform, on the one hand, and the 
imperative to respect “social dialogue” and basic safety nets, on the other. Despite 
the redefinition of structural reforms as major inputs into the post-crisis idea of 
Social Europe, pre-crisis Social Europe is still present and presenting points of 
tension. 
One of the most important sources of tension is labor reform. On the one hand, 
the Commission was recommending labor reforms that would deal with wage 
“rigidities” such as excessive employment protection or decoupling wages from 
inflation. On the other hand, it also recommended that such reforms proceed 
“respecting traditions of social dialogue.”178 In the case of Greece’s EAPs, as we 
saw, there was very little regard for such traditions, while Portugal’s program, which 
included a provision for respecting “social dialogue,” also proceeded pretty much via 
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government fiat.179 The country-specific recommendations for countries without loan 
agreements within the euro zone have included exhortations for respecting social 
dialogue. It is not clear yet what the result would be in a scenario in which social 
dialogue at the Member State level did not yield the desired results. There are some 
indications, though, that it would not sit very well with the Commission in its role as 
economic policy coordinator. Commission staff, in the 2013 preparatory work for 
reform recommendations to France, noted that “uneven” acceptance of labor 
flexibility reforms by social partners might decrease the effectiveness of reforms 
already undertaken.180 The Commission’s official recommendation included an 
exhortation to the French government to adopt whatever branch/enterprise specific 
agreements necessary to give full effectiveness to labor reforms already adopted at 
the legislative level.181 
A second policy tension could exist between recommendations in the field of 
social protection and in the field of taxation. On the one hand, the Commission 
observed that, “cost and quality of housing are a key determinant of living standards 
and well-being, especially for the most vulnerable people.”182 On the other hand, in 
its tax guidelines in the 2012 AGS, the Commission noted that, “to enhance labour 
mobility and efficient allocation of the housing stock, rebalancing housing taxation 
away from transaction towards recurrent taxes might be warranted.”183 The idea that 
Member States should move towards recurrent property taxes has been repeated 
elsewhere and seems to be part of the new technocratic understanding promoted 
through the AGS. Transaction taxes that happen only once seem to encourage neither 
enough labor mobility nor the efficient allocation of the housing stock because they 
allow people who cannot afford recurrent taxes, nor potentially property 
maintenance, to keep these houses. 
Greece immediately comes to mind as an example where the application of this 
tax recommendation could lead to the immediate impoverishment of the least 
protected, since Greece has one of the highest rates of homeownership in Europe 
thanks to its strong family inheritance regime coupled with non-recurrent taxes. In 
the context of the current crisis, implementation of such a recommendation would 
mean possible dispossession of the middle-aged unemployed who inherited their 
houses, but cannot afford to pay recurrent taxes anymore. The troika’s insistence on 
the implementation of the measure has already created significant ripples in Greece. 
The Commission’s insistence on a specific type of tax reform for the sake of 
efficiency may possibly undercut their fight against poverty. 
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V. TECHNOCRACY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
The new Social Europe emerging out of the crisis management measures 
strongly associates social justice with the distribution of existing jobs between 
different groups of workers and better access to the market with equity. The post-
crisis direction of EU required policy reform indicates that social progressives seem 
to have lost another battle in the struggle to define the contents of Social Europe. As 
things stand, their most important victory is the Commission’s rhetorical use of 
defending European social models as justification for the process of dismantling, 
especially the decommodification aspects of continental welfare states.184  
The Commission’s reform stance throughout the crisis calls for an explanation. 
One can imagine two initially plausible accounts. A first account, which we can call 
“ideational,” would posit that the Commission’s seeming endorsement of 1990s style 
reform reflects a hurried reaction to market pressures on the euro rather than 
confidence in the growth spurring potential of structural reforms. Bond vigilantes are 
testing the choppy waters of European governance, and would like to see reduced 
debt levels and increased private investment. Therefore, the Commission does not 
have much choice but to comply with what it thinks markets want. In addition, the 
Commission may be responding to pressures from a European Central Bank 
dominated by the ordoliberal school of economics eager to guarantee that any future 
fiscal and banking union will not be characterized by inflation prone policies, such 
as printing money.185 There is some reason to think that this is not an implausible 
account. 
A second, “political realist” explanation would suggest that this is all a process 
driven by politics and, more specifically, the national politics currently driving 
European integration. Germany is the country that holds the biggest purse supporting 
an already planned banking and fiscal union. Its citizens will only cede part of the 
purse if there are strings attached, strings that make sure Germany is not engaged in 
funding someone else’s generous welfare regime. This account has perhaps even 
more plausibility than the first one, but may also explain only part of the picture. 
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After all, Germany’s own welfare state may eventually be on the line as well as a 
result of the Commission’s proposed reforms.186 
This Article suggests a third account, which I will call “technocratic path 
dependence,” not as an alternative that excludes the other two, but rather as a story 
that may complete the picture. This account has an institutional and a substantive 
arm.  
From the institutional perspective, one needs to note that European integration 
was from the very beginning designed as an elite bureaucratic project that would be 
capable of counter-acting centrifugal, nationalist forces.187 Furthermore, integration 
through the management of spillover effects of prior integration is not new.188 Neo-
functionalist ideas about spillover effects of certain policy areas propelling further 
integration are strongly reflected in the Commission’s version of what went wrong 
before the crisis and how Europe could move forward.189 According to this account, 
a monetary policy designed without enough preventive and corrective measures for 
macro-economic imbalances created a spillover effect that every European country is 
now paying. The natural solution to this problem is further integration.190 The 
technocratic path dependence account suggests that a European bureaucracy 
institutionally invested in the project of European integration and trained to think of 
crises as opportunities for further integration is doing exactly what it has done 
previously, which is to take the goal of fully fledged political union as a given and 
strive towards that goal with whatever means available.  
The now almost inverted language about program “ownership” permeating 
Commission policy documents is an important indication of how deep the belief in 
integration by technocracy runs in the institution. Program ownership ideas appeared 
in the OMC process soon after the Lisbon strategy. They were meant to provide 
more meaningful citizen participation in policy formulation.191 However, the 
documents produced by the Commission since the beginning of the crisis have 
almost inverted the meaning of ownership. Notice the following quote from the AGS 
2011: 
In spite of the urgency of the situation, progress by Member States in 
implementing the guidance of the 2011 Annual Growth Survey is below 
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expectations. There is not yet full ownership, at national level, of the 
radical changes which have been decided in terms of future economic 
governance. There is sometimes a disconnection between what is decided 
at EU level and the length of time it takes to come through in national 
policy decisions. To remedy this, a sense of urgency needs to accompany 
the next European semester, with rapid and demonstrable follow through 
by Member States of EU level guidance. An implementation gap also 
exists at EU level, where decisions already agreed are not fully or well 
implemented by Member States, even in areas of core importance . . . .192 
Reference to lack of “ownership” here simply denotes an implementation gap by 
national governments in carrying through the radical changes which have already 
been decided and which need to be corrected. The Commission’s complaint boils 
down to lack of implementation of top down decision-making.  
The substantive arm of the technocratic path dependency account would suggest 
that there is an entrenchment of belief in the neoliberal ideas reflected in the crisis 
management measures and the new macro-economic governance framework. This 
article has argued that reform measures reflecting neoliberal ideas about growth have 
made it from the loan conditionality of bailout countries into the European Semester. 
Macro-economic coordination has been redefined to include areas of policy such as 
employment and social policy, defining certain measures in those areas as 
technocratically justified by the imperative of macro-economic stability. This is not a 
break, but rather as a continuation and deepening of a previous trend in European 
social policy formation through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Right 
before the Greek crisis broke out, the European Commission was focusing on trying, 
and failing, to get Member States to conform to this normative version of Social 
Europe by transforming their traditional schemes of dividing welfare provisioning 
between the family, the market, and the state, by relying more on the market, rather 
than the family or the state.  
How deeply entrenched might a substantive belief in the power of structural 
reforms be amongst Europe’s technocrats? More work is needed, especially 
empirical, to clarify whether this turn can indeed be identified with the work of 
Commission technocrats in combination with Member State bureaucrats convinced 
of the technocratic merits of this agenda. Certain top-level actors, like Commissioner 
Olli Rehn certainly express themselves as believers in a “competitiveness 
agenda.”193 It would be interesting to know the depth of entrenchment of this agenda 
within the Commission and within Member State top-level bureaucracies. A 
counterhypothesis would be that the Commission’s agenda for growth is being 
shaped by the limitations of a monetary union without appropriate tools for crisis 
management such as fiscal power. In other words, it might be that the Commission’s 
current agenda does not reflect a clear idea about growth enhancing structural 
reforms but the rather sharp limits of trying to save the euro without tools usually in 
the technocrat’s toolkit. If the latter hypothesis were true, then perhaps the new 
Social Europe emerging out of crisis management at EU level is an ephemeral 
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phenomenon, likely to disappear if and when the planned political union with direct 
democratic legitimation of the Commission’s agenda materialized. 
However, as long as European elites remain convinced that the crisis is an 
opportunity to move Europe to its ultimate destiny, the “ever closer union,” and as 
long as the northern Europeans continue to believe in the ants/grasshoppers version 
of what went wrong, the dynamics in place are likely to keep producing a version of 
European integration that entails variations of this new Social Europe. In other 
words, a substantive belief in the new Social Europe agenda may not even be 
necessary for its incorporation into EU policy. 
Take the Commission’s Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).194 Its advocacy for full fiscal and economic union is 
coupled with indirect assurances to surplus countries that the EMU would not be 
transformed into a Europe-wide welfare state. Instead, it would be endowed with “an 
EMU-level stabilisation tool to support adjustment to asymmetric shocks.”195 At 
each step, the Commission addresses worried audiences that this fiscal capacity 
would not be geared towards “permanent transfers,” but would instead be 
“supportive of structural reforms and be subject to strict political conditionality to 
avoid moral hazard.”196 The Blueprint also includes an institutional innovation 
directly transferred from the management of the loan agreements into pan-European 
macroeconomic governance. The Commission is proposing linking the structural 
funds, the only cross-country transfers in the European Union, with the national 
reform programs, and demanding “rigorous macroeconomic conditionality.”197 This 
idea draws heavily upon the experience of international financial institutions and the 
troika in managing loan agreements with indebted countries. The substantive ideas in 
the Blueprint also heavily borrow from the crisis management. The Commission’s 
plan envisions enacting future legislative capacity for the EU in the area of labor 
markets, “given the importance of well-functioning labour markets and in particular 
labour mobility for adjustment capacity and growth within the euro area.”198 Thus, a 
combination of the Commission’s technocratic take on further European integration 
with the current political circumstances are likely to produce a dynamic of further 
entrenchment of policy tendencies already evident through the EU crisis 
management.  
This same dynamic also creates democratic legitimacy problems. Questions that, 
from the citizen’s point of view, constitute fundamental re-engineering of the social 
contract, are defined as technocratic imperatives for the sake of saving and then 
deepening the EMU. They are also defined as, already by necessity, implied in the 
existing legal framework. According to the Commission, the deepening of the EMU 
in the short term, which requires “structural reforms necessary to overcome 
imbalances and to improve competitiveness,”199 should be achieved within the 
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already existing Treaty framework because the euro is a product of the Treaties.200 
More importantly, the Commission argues that Treaty amendments should be 
avoided when possible and that where needed, they should be drafted carefully so as 
to ensure the “democratic ownership needed for a smooth ratification process.”201  
This effort to take outside the realm of democratic contestation issues of a 
deeply political and redistributive nature, such as fundamental aspects of social and 
employment policy, for the sake of a euro driven technocratic imperative is unlikely 
to convince as sufficient “input legitimacy.”202 This is especially so at this difficult 
moment in time when the EU’s “output legitimacy,” the acceptance of EU 
policymaking on the basis of its concrete results, is being challenged because of the 
devastating effects of the crisis. The question of what would constitute adequate 
democratic legitimacy for such re-engineering of the institutional setup of the EMU 
deserves separate treatment.203 This Article has argued that the tendency towards 
turning political issues into technocratically determined goals is already visible in 
post-crisis EU governance and hypothesizes that it is likely to continue, despite the 
problems that it poses for the democratic legitimacy of the European integration 
project. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article traced the transformation of a structural adjustment program 
designed as conditionality for bailout countries into a reform agenda for every euro 
zone member. It argued that the agenda’s neoliberal reforms have made it into the 
core of European economic governance through the European Semester, in a 
significant episode of competence creep. Furthermore, this agenda has been justified 
as necessary for the sake of European welfarism. The new, post-crisis Social Europe 
centers on a flexibilization agenda, with member state governments, like company 
CEOs, responsible for turning their citizens into the most productive workers for the 
sake of export-led growth. This new Social Europe has arrived through a 
technocratic turn in economic governance, which was already visible in the OMC at 
least since 2005, but has become more entrenched through the EU crisis 
management process. The effort to justify this new direction through an argument of 
technocratic necessity is unlikely to provide the necessary democratic legitimacy for 
the deeply political issues at stake. 
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